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This research examines ethnic conflicts in Indonesia from 1998 to 2004 in an 
attempt to identify their underlying causes by using two case studies of ethnic conflict, 
one on Maluku Island and one in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The lessons learned that I drew 
from those two case studies address the questions, of why have ethnic conflicts in 
Indonesia taken place more frequently since 1998 and what the best strategies for the 
Indonesian government to use to prevent the eruption of ethnic conflicts in Indonesia in 
the future? With regard to the lessons learned from Maluku and Poso, this research 
generally concludes that underlying factors such as political disputes, economic and 
social disparities, religious and cultural differences, and tribal disputes have contributed 
to the current ethnic conflicts in Indonesia. Among the underlying factors, political 
disputes and economic and social disparities outweighed the other factors and played a 
more significant role in triggering the initial conflicts.  This research contributes valuable 
information to the Indonesian government and non-governmental organizations in 
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After the Asian monetary crisis struck Indonesia in 1998 and the resignation of 
President Suharto in that same year, Indonesia became overwhelmed by several serious 
ethnic conflicts. These conflicts have inflicted enormous casualties and severely damaged 
many government assets and private properties. The recent rise of ethnic conflicts in 
Indonesia recently has made many scholars both in Indonesia and foreign countries raise 
some important questions. They include: Why have ethnic conflicts in Indonesia taken 
place more frequently since 1998 and what are the best strategies the Indonesian 
government can use to prevent the eruption of similar ethnic conflicts in Indonesia in the 
future?  
In response to the questions above, this research uses two case studies regarding 
ethnic conflict, in Maluku Island and Poso in Central Sulawesi, to examine the 
underlying factors that triggered the initial conflicts. In addition, the case studies also 
provide useful information about the chronology of conflict within both areas in more 
detail and explain how the conflict evolved into large-scale violence. With regard to the 
lessons learned that are drawn from the ethnic conflicts in Maluku and Poso,  this 
research generally concludes that underlying factors such as political disputes, economic 
and social disparities, religious and cultural differences, and tribal disputes have 
contributed to the current ethnic conflicts in Indonesia. Nonetheless, among those 
underlying factors, political disputes and economic and social disparities outweighed the 
other factors and played a more significant role in triggering the initial conflict.  
Recommended measures for preventing similar future ethnic conflicts in Indonesia are 




























Figure 1.   The Chart of the Riots in Indonesia (From: <www.Fica.org> (accessed 
November 11, 2005)) 
 
Indonesia has experienced several severe ethnic conflicts since 1998. The anti-
Chinese riots in Jakarta and Dayak and the Madurese conflict in Kalimantan, as well as 
ethno-religious conflicts in Molluca and Poso from 1998 to 2001 revealed a radical 
change in Indonesian ethnic relations. The New Order regime under President Soeharto 
was able to prevent the eruption of ethnic conflicts in Indonesia and generally maintained 
a peaceful co-existence. Though we cannot say that the New Order regime was a 
completely peaceful regime in 1998, we can, at least, say that security conditions before 
the collapse of the regime were better than they are now.  These two contrasting 
2situations in Indonesia raise a nagging question as to why current ethnic conflicts in 
Indonesia have become far more intense than during the previous decade. 
The search for an explanation for current ethnic conflicts in Indonesia is now an 
imperative for government agencies. Policymakers, politicians, government officials, and 
military commanders feel that Indonesia is encircled by a ring of violence. If the violence 
does not stop immediately, it could spread throughout the country. These are many 
reasons for this. Indonesia consists of three hundred ethnic groups with different religious 
and cultural backgrounds. In addition, recent demographic shifts, political changes, and 
rapid economic globalization have made many Indonesian regions more vulnerable.  
However, in regard to Indonesia in particular, there are many people who believe 
that the ethnic conflict will not become widely spread. They argue that Indonesia cannot 
be compared to the Balkans or Africa and that Indonesia will never turn into another 
Balkan region. This is because of the cultural, political, economic and religious 
differences between Indonesia and the Balkans or Africa. This argument is true insofar as 
many current ethnic conflicts in Indonesia have been contained. However, with regard to 
a certain degree of uniqueness of ethnic conflicts, it is hard to predict whether it will 
become contagious. Moreover, once a conflict exists, it often spreads quickly, leaving 
many lives destroyed. It can even turn into genocide, as was the case in Rwanda and 
Bosnia. Therefore, the ignorance or unawareness of the Indonesian people about the 
contagious effect of ethnic conflicts could lead to extreme situations, such as an extensive 
ethno-religious conflict or, ultimately the disintegration of the nation. 
To explain how ethnic conflicts in Indonesia evolved over time after the collapse 
of President Suharto’s regime in 1998, I will present some theories from several studies 
of Indonesian ethnic conflicts. These studies help to explain, theoretically and 
empirically, the root causes of ethnic conflicts in Indonesia and the reason they became 
more intensive after 1998, when, politically and economically, Indonesia was in a bad 
shape. Some writers cite the economic crisis and the collapse of President Suharto’s 
regime in 1998 as two major factors that triggered the ethnic conflicts, while others argue 
that a tendency for such conflicts had been embedded in Indonesian culture for a long 
time. 
3A. EXISTING THEORIES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN INDONESIA 
First, I will examine the theory of ethnic conflict provided by Jacques Bertrand in 
his book Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Quoting Paul Brass, Richard 
Snyder, Benedict Anderson, and Clifford Geertz, Bertrand suggests three major 
approaches that have been used to explain “why ethnicity sometimes becomes a channel 
for political struggle and conflict.”1 First, those who use “constructivist” approaches 
argue that historical and social circumstances can shape, transform, and define ethnic 
boundaries, and form the bases of conflict. Second, “instrumentalist” approaches 
emphasize the role of ethnic elites in competition for state power, resources, and private 
interests: they mobilize mass support by using the emotional appeals of ethnic identity to 
achieve their goals. Third, “primordialist” approaches focus on “the inheritance of ethnic 
traits by birth and the immutability of group boundaries.” To put it succinctly, “ethnic 
groups are seen as inherently prone to hostility by the nature of their group.”2 These three 
main approaches are used not only by Bertrand to draw a preliminary hypothesis for his 
analysis of Indonesia but also by other scholars to explain ethnic conflict in other regions 
such as Africa and the Balkans. 
With regard to ethnic conflict in Indonesia, Bertrand argues that conflict does not 
derive from group identities as is the case other regions such as Rwanda (the conflict 
between Hutus and Tutsis). Instead, it can best be explained by looking at the emergence 
of group anxieties produced by the changing political, cultural, social, and political 
circumstances. Therefore, “group fears and grievances are… rooted in the context in 
which ethnic identities are constructed and mobilized.” In addition, most of the time, 
group fears, tensions, or grievances are out of sight, “with the most common forms of 
political action remaining in the realm of the ‘hidden transcript.’” Publicly, ethnic groups 
display how cordial their relations are, how peaceful their coexistence with one another 
is, and even how they support inter-ethnic cooperation. Nonetheless, this outward 
appearance of harmony is misleading; it conceals “a hidden transcript of acrimony, 
grumbling, suspicion, and even hatred.”3 Bertrand proceeds to analyze Indonesia’s 
                                                 
1 Jacques Bertrand. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. New York: Cambridge, 2004, p. 10. 
2 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
3 Jacques Bertrand. Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
4national model and its institutionalization during the New Order, in the late 1990s when 
the social, political, economic and cultural context abruptly changed along ethnic lines, 
resulting in a flare-up of ethnic conflicts. He claims that his analysis of that “critical 
juncture” partly explains current ethnic conflicts in Indonesia.4  
In the late 1990s, the Indonesian people considered renegotiating their national 
model and institutions. But the wider opportunity provided during this period caused 
uncertainty among many groups who sought to renegotiate the terms of their exclusion or 
inclusion and the allocation of power and resources. Previously, tensions among groups 
had already been high due to perceptions of discrimination and injustice, but the possible 
reaction from most groups toward these issues remained relatively neutral. When 
exogenous factors such as the economic crisis, regime transition, and other important 
domestic events coincided in Indonesia in 1998, a crisis, or critical juncture, resulted that 
abruptly altered ethnic relation. And a period of transformation created volatile relations 
between ethnic groups. Hence, politicians and conflict entrepreneurs used these 
circumstances to mobilize mass support in order to pursue their private interests, either 
political or economic, which eventually led to ethnic conflicts.5 To better illustrate what 












                                                 
4 “Critical junctures are triggered by exogenous factors or emerge out of tensions created by previous 
institutionalized forms of ethnic relations. At these junctures, violence tends to occur as anxieties rise and 
ethnic group become uncertain about past compromises and institutional settings,” Ibid., p. 23.  














Figure 2.   Critical Junctures, National Models, and Ethnic Relations 
 
Bertrand’s theory has been both corroborated and challenged by others. Some 
have elaborated on the mechanisms of control, especially the role of coercion under 
Suharto. These mechanisms were useful in maintaining the national model supported by 
the regime. For example, it is pointed out that “Indonesia under Suharto was on the whole 
relatively peaceful because it had the political, administrative, and military mechanisms 
to discipline the eruption of social disaffection, and it is the end of the New Order and the 
collapse of its disciplinary mechanisms that account for the violence of recent years.”6 
This argument is supported by Lorraine Aragon who did research on the Moslem-
Christian conflict in Poso. During her time in Poso, she was repeatedly told by people 
that for thirty-two years, during the New Order regime under President Suharto’s 
leadership, Poso had been a peaceful place but violence was everywhere now. According 
to Aragon, military control mechanisms accounted for the relatively peaceful conditions 
during the New Order and prevented the expressions of communal dissatisfaction.7 
                                                 
6 Varshney Ashutosh, Rizal Pangabean, and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin. “Patterns of Collective 
Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003).” United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery. Working 
Paper-04/0. Jakarta, 2004, p. 20. 
7 Ibid., p. 21. 
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6Others add that the logic of Indonesia’s ethnic conflict is embedded in “the very 
institutions of the New Order [which] created profound social and political exclusion, 
bred distrust of the state, and often relied on overt violence.” Within the ethno-religious 
confinement of the “national model” during the New Order, the Dayaks and Papuans 
were excluded for their lack of modernity, the Chinese for their lack of nativity, and the 
Moslems on the basis of their ideology. At a very significant level, these models of 
exclusion could only be sustained by coercion. However, coercion itself was not able to 
keep a system running forever and violence tended to breed violence. Studying the 
institutional characteristics during the New Order allows one to understand more fully 
why only some groups were targeted during the conflict such as the Chinese, the 
Madurese and the Bugese. It also gives plausible answers as to why conflict or violence 
was concentrated in some geographical regions of Indonesia and not more generalized.8  
Nonetheless, some disagree with Bertrand that the overall conditions in Indonesia 
during the New Order were peaceful. Several incidents such as the massacre of hundreds 
of thousands of Communists in the mid-1960s, the Tanjung Priok riot in 1984, the labor 
strikes in the Southern part of Surabaya in May 1993, and the anti-Chinese riot in 1998, 
and many others challenge the assumption that the New Order regime was peaceful. In 
fact, it can be argued that conflict has been embedded in Indonesian culture and society 
for a long time. The current conflict is not only the legacy of the New Order but also part 
of a longer historical tradition of violence. This argument is supported by historical 
evidence of violence from a study by Colombijn and Nordholt. There were many cases of 
thieves and pickpockets caught red-handed and were killed by the mob, such as in 1904 
in Central Java, around 1909 in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and in 1882 in West Sumatera. 
Another example of historical violence concerned the jago during the 19 century in Java. 
These were bullies used by the colonial government to extract revenues and to intimidate 
people. Although historical and cultural perspectives contribute greatly to explaining the 
current conflict in Indonesia, culture cannot fully answer the question as to “why did a 
mere 15 Kabupaten (districts), which contain only 6.5 per cent of Indonesia’s total 
population, have as much as 85.5 per cent of all deaths in collective violence between 
                                                 
8 Varshney Ashutosh et al. “Patterns,” op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
71990 and 2003?”9  There are still many regions in Indonesia where peace is still 
preserved and the people get along with one another during long periods of time. 
While the above studies focus especially on long-term processes, there are others 
that examine more immediate causes, such as demographic shifts caused by government 
policy of transmigration, competing interests in local resources and power, inter-group 
interaction and psychological factors. According to Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti,  
ethnic tension actually is not a recent phenomenon. It already had potential 
in Indonesia and the seeds of conflict [one of which was the poorly 
prepared transmigration policy] were planted for more than 30 years ago, 
when the complex process of state-making did not create a political space 
for pluralism, but more uniforms.10  
Thus recent conflicts in Molluca, Poso, Mataram, and Kalimantan were caused by 
long-lasting conflicts of interest between indigenous people and migrants. This pattern of 
conflict grows especially in the regions which actually had had religious harmony. The 
shift in the demographic composition due to migration changed the balance of power. 
Political and economic competition and inequality between settlers and migrants quickly 
polarized both groups that altered existing ethnic relations. Therefore, even small clashes 
between indigenous people and migrants could lead to an ethnic conflict.  
Another study sponsored by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) agrees that the central dynamic of communal conflict, including 
ethnic conflict, is “competition between regional elites over access to political and 
economic power.”11 Ethnic, religious and cultural divisions were aggravated and 
worsened for years in Indonesia through political competition and exclusion, excessive 
repression, demographic shifts, and government economic policies that favored a small 
group of people who were close to the central power. Grievance and greed were fueled by 
the economic crisis in 1998 and the anticipation of the advantages that might be gained 
from otonomi daerah (decentralization) following the collapse of the New Order regime. 
What made matters worse is that in the areas where conflicts would erupt, “patronage 
                                                 
9 Varshney Ashutosh, et al. op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
10 Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti. “Migration and Conflict in Indonesia.” IUSSP Regional Population 
Conference in Bangkok, June 2002, pp. 2-3. 
11 Sharon Morris, et. al. “Conflict in Indonesia.” United States Agency for International Development, 
January 2002, p. 6. 
8networks and personal connections are often the only route to economic opportunity.” It 
is thus natural that elites turned to these networks, which are often ethnically based, in 
order to mobilize large number of young, unemployed men.” State and social institutions 
were ill-equipped to deal with the dynamics of tension in the current political conditions 
and even actively fed the causes of conflict.12  
What has been missing from the above studies is the role of laws and social norms 
and the dynamics of ethnic conflict once started. These factors are the focus of a World 
Bank study.13 In this study, the researchers suggest two realms that have to be carefully 
looked at, first, the “rules of the game” which means the norms and laws that form the 
immediate context, where disputants, their representatives, and mediators involve one 
another. The second realm is the “dynamic of difference” that relates to the norms and 
politics of ethnic relations. Within this realm, the researchers focus on the ways and 
means the differences are constructed and “are able to be mobilized, re-imagined, and 
exploited for strategic advantage.”14 
The “rules of the game” explains the rule system within society that regulates 
people’s behavior in response to social conditions. By doing so, people can understand 
how political, social and economic relations are constructed and how people and their 
communities communicate with one another. The researchers argue that understanding 
the rule system is critical for explaining the current ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Based on 
that statement, the researchers develop a theory by stating that conflicts are less likely to 
step up and even turn into violence if most people within a society have “a collective 
sense of what behavior is acceptable.” Conversely, conflicts will escalate into violence 
when the rule system that governs people’s behavior is disputed and people tend to 
engage in provocative and eventually conflict of behavior. This outcome might be the 
results of the following possible events. First, people do not realize that their behavior 
violates the other party’s rules. Second, although people understand the other rule of laws 
                                                 
12 Sharon Morris, et. al. “Conflict,” op. cit., p. 7. 
13 Patrick Barron, Claire Q. Smith, and Michael Woolcock. “Understanding Local Level Conflict in 
Developing Countries: Theory, Evidence and Implications from Indonesia.” Conflict Prevention and 
Reconstruction. Paper No. 19. Indonesia, 2004, p. 10. 
14 The authors also discuses another realm which centers on the role of mediators, leaders, and 
government officials in conflict resolution. 
9that is applicable to them, they tend to ignore them. Lastly, some people want to benefit 
from the confusion of the existing rule of laws and tend to interpret them differently.15 
The possible violation of the rule system within current Indonesian society is mainly 
influenced by globalization which enables people to move more easily from one area to 
another. In effect, the demographic change and the shift from a homogenous to 
heterogeneous society that have brought more people with different customary laws, rule 
systems and norms together in one place have made this society more complicated than 
ever before. 
The second realm is the “dynamic of difference” between groups which 
constitutes how intra-group norms, interests and identity are determined, and in turn, “the 
corresponding bases and political salience of differences between groups may fluctuate.” 
Thus, based on the researchers’ field studies, they argue that there are two ways how the 
“dynamic of difference” between groups can lean to a conflict. First, the researchers posit 
what they call the “mechanism for mobilizing group identity.” According to them, there 
are many ways that can be used by leaders to mobilize group identity for the purpose of 
conflict. The most common way observed in Indonesia was the encouragement of a 
particular group of people to fear others. Other ways of mobilizing people for the purpose 
of conflict are through political and economic gains. However, no mechanism for 
mobilizing group identity for the purpose of conflict will be as effective as it can be when 
channeled through traditional social systems such as those that control the distribution of 
water and land allotment based on ethnicity. The other way of creating a conflict through 
“the dynamic of difference” between groups is to reinforce divisive identities. This 
method, according to this study, is dependent on the group leaders’ capacity to reframe 
and reinforce group identity for the conflict. In most circumstances, this method is 
especially vital when deployed during the evolution of conflict and the escalation phase. 
In addition, when the very basic identity of one group is under attack, reframing and 
reinforcing group identity can intensify a group’s boundary that formerly may have been 
less distinct.16 These methods are argued to cause local ethnic conflicts to escalate 
quickly in Kalimantan, Poso, and Maluku.  
                                                 
15 Patrick Barron, et. al. “Understanding,” op. cit., p. 10. 
16 Patrick Barron, et. al. “Understanding,” op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
10
The “dynamic of difference” suggests the importance of inter-group interaction on 
a socio-economic level but does not deal adequately with psychological factors that 
operate either on participant at the individual level or between groups. For this we have to 
turn to a study by Ichsan Malik, who examines the way conflict can be triggered by 
“stereotypes” that label a particular ethnicity during their interaction.17 According to 
Ichsan, a “stereotype” is a preliminary and irresponsible judgment on characteristics that 
belong to a group of people and most of the times are negative. Then, by having a 
particular ethnic “stereotypes” in their minds, people tend to generalize about other 
people within that group. In effect, these kinds of situation create a discriminatory 
perspective against others and can potentially escalate into violence if other factors such 
as socio-economy, politics and culture are involved.  
None of the above theories on ethnic conflict in Indonesia are either wholly 
wrong or completely accurate. Each of them has its own weaknesses and strengths. 
Bertrand’s theory of critical juncture attempts to reach a deeper level in explaining the 
ethnic conflict in Indonesia and moves from a discussion of ethnic identity to an 
examination of ethnic anxiety, which was aroused during the transitional period. Bertrand 
offers a powerful answer to the question why ethnic conflicts in Indonesia took place far 
more intensely after 1998 when people renegotiated the terms of their exclusion and 
inclusion. However, his theory does not touch upon the underlying factors that triggered 
the initial conflict in many regions in Indonesia such as local political disputes and 
economic and social disparities. While immediate factors have been further elaborated by 
later studies, his model may overlook the fact that conflict may have been embedded in 
Indonesian culture and society for a long time. Finally, his theory cannot explain exactly 
how the initial conflict (individual or group clashes) escalated into large-scale ethnic 
conflicts such as in the case of Poso and Maluku during 1998-2001. I believe that it is 
important for scholars to look more deeply at the local level in order to better understand 
and explain the current ethnic conflicts in Indonesia. For instance, how local political 
disputes and economics disparities exacerbated by other contingent factors have 
contributed to large-scale ethnic conflicts.  
                                                 
17 Ichsan Malik. “Kontribusi Psikososial dalam Penanganan Konflik.” (Socio-Psychological 
Contribution in Ethnic Conflict Resolution). University of Indonesia, March 3, 2005. 
11
Pudjiastuti’s study of the migration program makes an important contribution by 
explaining how the conflict of interests between migrants and the indigenous people 
escalated overtime and eventually led to violence. In addition, the theory also explains, 
when the conflict erupted, why only particular groups of people became targets such as, 
the Chinese, Bugesse, Butonese, and Javanese. Nonetheless, the theory cannot 
appropriately explain why only some areas of migration experienced a large-scale of 
ethnic conflict while others did not. In addition, the theory also cannot fully explain why 
most areas that have been experienced ethnic conflict were relatively peaceful prior to the 
conflict. For these issues, one has to look at the role of local norms, the dynamic of ethnic 
mobilization based on ethnic differences, and psychological processes that shape or 
transform the basis of conflict. These arguments better explain how ethnic conflicts in 
Indonesia took place within some areas such as in Poso, Maluku, and Kalimantan. Their 
weakness is that, by focusing on immediate causes, they do not fully explain why those 
conflicts took place more intensely after 1998.   
In sum, theories of ethnic conflict in Indonesia have contributed positively to 
explaining why ethnic conflicts in Indonesia have occurred more frequently since 1998. 
Ethnic conflict in Indonesia is indeed not a new issue; it has been embedded in society for 
years even before Indonesia was formed. Nonetheless, the very dynamics of Indonesian 
development influenced by internal and external challenges have brought Indonesia to 
encounter more serious ethnic conflict problems, potentially constituting both an obstacle 
to development and providing the fuel for a larger scale of violence. By identifying the 
strengths and weaknesses of existing theories on Indonesia’s ethnic conflict, I hope that I 
will be able to clarify some of those gaps. I also hope to be able to add to existing 
theories with empirical evidence I collect.  
B. THESIS PURPOSES AND ARGUMENTS  
This thesis examines ethnic conflicts in Indonesia and attempt to identify their 
underlying causes based on two case studies of ethnic conflict that occurred recently in 
Indonesia, namely the conflict in Maluku (Molluca) and the one that occurred in Poso in 
Central Sulawesi. These case studies are selected because they share several 
characteristics commonly observed in all ethnic conflicts in Indonesia, such as the role of 
indigenous people and migrants and the devastating outcomes in people’s lives and 
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properties. The curious fact is that people in the conflict areas lived together peacefully 
before violence started, and for the most part, these conflicts were initially triggered by 
economic and social, political, religious and cultural differences. Based on the lessons 
learned in Maluku and Poso, some generalizations about ethnic conflicts in Indonesia are 
made, together with recommended measures to prevent future conflicts. The analyses are 
based on library research, my military experience on dealing with ethnic conflicts, and 
my own perspective about current ethnic conflicts as an Indonesian.  
The two case studies on ethnic conflict in Maluku and Poso suggest a 
generalizable pattern of ethnic conflict in Indonesia. First, the more significant ethnic 
conflicts stemmed from relatively minor individual clashes involving monetary issues or 
alcohol abuse and no one could have predicted that those conflicts would escalate. 
Second, once a conflict erupted, it quickly got out of control and spread to other areas. 
Third, the outcomes of the conflicts were devastating, with considerable damage done to 
material goods and to people’s lives, as many became isolated because of their ethnicity 
and religion. Fourth, the escalation of comparatively minor confrontations into large- 
scale ethnic conflicts was partly because the local police, security forces and courts failed 
to properly address the initial disputes in keeping with existing laws. Fifth, the prolonged 
conflicts were hard to control because of the existence of cyclical revenge within and 
between warring parties and the involvement of third parties and conflict entrepreneurs, 
which continually undermined the government’s reconciliation efforts.  
Based on the case studies, the central argument here is that the initial conflicts 
within most of the conflict areas in Indonesia were triggered by underlying local 
factors—political disputes, economic and social disparities, religious and cultural 
differences, and tribal disputes. Furthermore, the more intensely these underlying factors 
were present in one area, the more likely ethnic conflict took place in that area. These 
factors have been embedded in Indonesian society for a long time. During the New Order 
regime, which imposed political, administration and military mechanism to discipline 
public dissatisfaction, the reaction toward differences or disputes was predictably muted. 
After 1998 onward, however, under the context of what Bertrand called exogenous 
factors such as regime change, economic crisis, and democratization, latent disputes and 
differences within Indonesian people intensified and eventually surfaced. 
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It is also argued here that political disputes and economic and social disparities 
outweighed other factors. There was a clear relationship between the eruption of conflict 
and local political disputes according to ethnic lines and religious affiliations in some 
areas such as in Poso and Maluku. Each conflict mostly started during political 
campaigns for strategic positions either for Bupati or Sekretaris Daerah. Moreover, 
economic and social disparities usually between migrants and indigenous people also 
exacerbated the political disputes in conflict areas. In short, we can see that even a small 
clash can lead to large-scale ethnic conflict when combined with economic, social and 
political factors. 
Here is an overview of the structure of the thesis, which proceeds in four sections. 
Chapter II presents the issue of ethnic conflict in Maluku and its five underlying factors. 
These factors involve five different issues, including political disputes, economic and 
social disparities, religious and cultural differences, and tribal disputes. Chapter III 
describes the conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi and its underlying factors, which also 
involve the same five issues as in Maluku. Chapter IV concludes the thesis with several 
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II. ETHNIC CONFLICT IN MALUKU: THE COLLAPSE OF 
PEACEFUL SOCIETY 
 
Figure 3.   The Map of Maluku (From: 
<www.accommodationsbali.com/maps/maluku.html> (accessed November 11, 
2005)) 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The Maluku archipelago is one of Indonesia’s provinces; Ambon was its capital 
city until 1999. In the year 2000,  Maluku was divided into two provinces, the Province 
of Maluku and the Province of North Maluku. Both provinces are located in the zone 
between three degrees north latitude, eight to thirty degrees south latitude, and 124 
degrees, 45 minutes, to 135 degrees east longitude. Their geographical borders are the 
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Pacific Ocean in the north, the Arafura Sea in the south, the Maluku Sea in the west, and 
Papua Island in the east. The total areas of both provinces combined cover approximately 
721,479.69 km2, of which 658,294.69 km2 are sea areas and 74.505 km2 are land 
areas.18 
Known primarily for its natural resources, Maluku was once also known as a 
peaceful region where multiethnic people had lived side by side peacefully for almost a 
hundred years. Maluku has also been a place that people with different religious 
backgrounds migrated to for a variety of reasons. Historically, Maluku, known as the 
“Spice Island” in the colonial period, was a source of trade for the Chinese, the 
Portuguese and the Dutch. As in the past, due to its various advantages Maluku is still a 
Promised Land for trade for peoples from nearby islands. Many who came to Maluku 
stayed, living from generation to generation without having any significant social or 
cultural problems with the indigenous people. Indeed, diversity, with all its dynamics, 
was never an obstacle for the people there because they lived in peace and with 
toleration. 
However, over the years, the number of newcomers increased significantly, and 
the indigenous population began to feel threatened by their overwhelming number. 
Several minor conflicts between migrants and indigenous people occurred; tension 
gradually spread throughout the society and has recently escalated. Without the people 
realizing it, the societal structure in Maluku had changed significantly, resulting in 
inequality. Job distribution, the division of labor, political and bureaucratic competition, 
land transfers from indigenous owners to migrants and religious tensions due to the 
structural societal changes were some of the issues among the people that began to ruin 
their long-time harmonious lifestyle. As a result, the area became divided along cultural, 
religious, and social-economic lines. Change in the societal structure of Maluku has led 
to increasing conflict. 
In 1997, Indonesia began experiencing severe economic crises that affected 
people’s lives at every strata of society.  In 1998, President Soeharto’s administration 
                                                 
18 Tapak Ambon. “Refugees of Maluku and North Maluku and Their Problems.” In Tapak Ambon 
paper. (April 17, 2003).  <http://www.titane.org/files/artikelen/tapak/artikel6.htm> (accessed March 10, 
2004). 
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collapsed and he was replaced by President B.J. Habibie. The transitional government 
and its initial embrace of a more democratic system, which paralleled the economic 
crisis, resulted in Indonesia’s current chaotic economic and political system.  
Subsequently, on January 19, 1999, Maluku experienced a tremendous ethnic conflict 
that immediately spread throughout the islands and resulted in the Indonesian armed 
forces and police losing control.  The toll of the conflict, Moslem and Christian, is 
estimated as approximately 5,000 people who died and more than 700,000 who were 
displaced.19 The horrible ethnic conflict in Maluku is a religious communal conflict such 
as Indonesia has not had since its struggle for independence in 1945 from the Dutch. 
Arguably, the economic crisis in 1997, the collapse of President Soeharto’s 
administration, and Indonesia’s initial embrace of a more democratic system have 
resulted in an outbreak of severe ethnic conflict in Maluku, starting in January 1999. 
If we begin at the local level and analyze how the initial conflict escalated into a 
larger ethnic conflict, we may find an answer to why ethnic conflict was able to break out 
at all in Maluku. With regard to that question, I will argue that there were several 
underlying factors that made Maluku more susceptible to ethnic conflict in late 1998. 
Among those underlying factors, political disputes and economic and social disparities 
outweighed all others and were responsible for triggering the initial conflict between two 
youths from different religious affiliations. Eventually, that small conflict escalated into a 
large conflict between Moslems and Christians. The initial individual dispute was also 
exacerbated by latent tribal disputes between the Bugese and the local Ambonese,  the 
tribes to which the two youths belonged. In effect, the tribal difference attracted 
additional people from each group to engage in the conflict. Furthermore, in the case of 
conflict in Maluku in particular, I find a connection between the local conflict and the 
roles of national actors. Indeed, many people believe that national elites and politicians 
were involved in triggering a local conflict so that they could pursue a political agenda 
and undermine President Wahid’s administration. However, the conflict was soon beyond 
national elites’ and politician’s control. And when conflict entrepreneurs intervened, they 
left behind tremendous devastation in both Maluku and its surrounding islands. 
                                                 
19 International Crisis Group. “Indonesia: Memburu Perdamaian in Maluku” (Indonesia: Seeking for 
Peace in Maluku). In ICG Asia Report No. 31.  February 8, 2002, p. 1. 
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From a broader scope, at the national level, borrowing Bertrand’s arguments 
about the “critical juncture” that occurred in Indonesia around 1997 through 1998, I 
believe that the national crises affected the overall stability of Maluku’s politics, 
economy, and security. Thus, exogenous factors such as the collapse of the New Order 
regime and the economic crisis created a moment when most people in Indonesia, 
including the people of Maluku, renegotiated their political power-sharing and identity, 
better known by the terms “inclusion” and “exclusion.” An effort to renegotiate political 
power-sharing and to reframe group identities intensifies the boundaries among groups 
that were previously less distinguishable and, possibly, escalates inter-group tensions. In 
addition, a conflict that, in effect, reframes group identities, may occur in areas where 
religious or ethnic hegemony is an essential factor shaping people’s daily societal lives 
and determining their relations with each other. In regard to Maluku, in particular, 
religion plays a big role in determining every aspect of people’s lives, be it political, 
economic, cultural, or social. Therefore, when conflict touched upon religious issues, it 
spread immediately and quickly polarized people.  
In this chapter, I will describe the ethnic conflict in Maluku in some detail. First, I 
will discuss Maluku’s conflict chronologically, from 1998 to 2004. Second, I will 
examine the underlying factors within its society that led Maluku to become more 
susceptible to ethnic conflict. Third, I will explore the Indonesian government’s response 
to the conflict in Maluku, because I believe that all these issue combined provide a more 
comprehensive picture of Maluku’s conflicts.  Furthermore, by explaining these issues, 
using the conflict in Maluku as a case study, I hope to find a substantial answer to my 
main thesis questions: Why have ethnic conflicts occurred frequently in Indonesia since 
1998? Were the conflicts due to any significant differences among the Indonesian people, 
for example, religious, cultural, or political differences? Did economic differences trigger 
the conflict? Why was the Indonesian government unable to identify the early symptoms 
of the conflict? What constraints or barriers does the government face in preventing 
further eruptions of conflict, so that they do not occur in the future? 
B.  CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICTS 
The first outburst of violence in Maluku occurred in 1950 when Dr. Somoukil, 
supported by some dissatisfied officers of the former Dutch colonial army, declared 
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independence for the South Mollucan Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan-RMS). All of 
the RMS members were from the majority Christian Ambonese community and had 
worked for the Dutch during the colonialization period. They refused to let Maluku 
become part of the Unitary State of Indonesia. Subsequently, the Indonesian government 
under president Soekarno rejected this new state and sent in troops to crack down on the 
South Mollucan Republican movement. After a few months of conflict against the 
Indonesian National Army, the secessionist movement was defeated.20  During the 
following decades, this rich region became a relatively peaceful state.  
In 1999, violence erupted again in what can be viewed as a tremendous religious 
communal conflict in Indonesia. Before then, Maluku was a relatively peaceful province 
under President Soeharto’s administration. The deadly conflict that started in 1999 
continued without ceasing until 2004. Fortunately, since 2004, there has been no 
reoccurrence of the horrible conflict of the past; however, sporadic tension and conflicts 
are still ongoing in the Maluku archipelago. For instance, roadside bombings, communal 
clashes, and random shootings of people continue. In the following section, I will 
describe the chronology of conflict in Maluku to show why the conflict continued 
without ceasing for several years. 
In general, the conflict can be divided into three phases: the first phase, from 
January to April 1999; the second phase, from July to December 1999; and the third 
phase, from April 2000 to 2004.21 
1.  Phase One: January to April 1999   
The initial phase of the conflict erupted on January 19, 1999 and continued until 
the end of April 1999, when the Moslem community in Ambon prepared to celebrate 
Hari Raya Idul Fitri, a holy day for Moslems throughout the world. Before that, at the 
end of 1998 certain scattered occurrences of violence, such as the conflict in Wailete on 
December 13, 1998, in Air Bak on December 27, 1998, and in Batu Gantung Waringin 
on January 5, 1999, had erupted in Ambon.22  However, the violence did not spread 
                                                 
20 Jacques Bertrand. Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 115-116. 
21 Lambang Trijono. “Religious Communal Conflict and Multi-Track Resolution: Lesson from 
Ambon, Indonesia.” Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah University. <http://www.csps-
ugm.or.id/artikel/Pus001LT.htm> (accessed April 9, 2005), p. 5. 
22 Ibid. 
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widely in Maluku and was successfully contained in the local areas.  Those earlier 
outbreaks were also mild in comparison to that of January 19, 1999, which “initiated the 
eruption of a sequence of conflicts”23 that have continued up to 2004. 
The first deadly conflict that began on January 19, 1999 was triggered by a 
dispute between two youth groups in Ambon city, one from the Christian village of Batu 
Merah, the other from a Moslem village, Mardika.24 The conflict apparently stemmed 
from an individual dispute over minibus fares. In way of explaining the initial conflict, 
we need to look at the two versions of the conflict that spread among Christian and 
Moslem communities before the conflict dramatically escalated. The first version 
accounts for the conflict derived from the Christian community and the second one was 
the version from the Moslem community.  Both versions had their own way to disperse 
widely to the entire region and eventually triggered the conflict that erupted on 19 
January 1999.25 
According to the Christian version, around 2:30 p.m. on January 19, two Moslem 
youths from Merdika, named Salim and Usman approached a Christian youth from Batu 
Merah, named Yopi. Yopi was a driver of a public transport van at the Batu Merah 
terminal and had just started his shift. The two Moslem youths26 demanded Rp 500 (equal 
to U.S. fifty cents) from Yopi, which he refused to pay, because he just started his shift 
and had no money yet. After his first trip, about half an hour, to Mardika terminal, Yopi 
returned to the Batu Merah terminal with no passengers on board. He found the Moslem 
youths still there, waiting for the money. He told them he had no money yet and asked 
them to stop their demands. Suddenly, one of them took out his Badik, a traditional knife 
and pointed it at Yopi’s neck. After a brief scuffle, Yopi was able to get away and drove 
the van again to Mardika, hoping Salim and Usman would leave. He was wrong; when he 
returned again to Batu Merah terminal, the youths again asked him for money. Salim took 
                                                 
23 Trijono, Lambang. “Religious Communal Conflict,” op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
24 Ibid., p. 6. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Human Right Watch. “Indonesia: The Violence in Maluku.” Report on Violence in Ambon. March 
1999, Vol. 11, No. 1 (C).  <http://www.fica.org/hr/ambon/idMaluku-HRW.html> (accessed April 9, 2005), 
p. 11. 
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out his knife and ran after Yopi.27 This version of the dispute eventually ended with a 
conflict between the Moslem Salim and the Christian Yopi. Such situations were 
common in Maluku, and disputes among youth groups or gangs were usually contained 
and settled peacefully through religious leaders talking to those involved. Peace was then 
ensured by the police.   
The Moslem version of the dispute stated that Yopi, the van driver, had a Moslem 
helper, from Batu Merah Dalam and that the van belonged to a Moslem Bugis tribal 
migrant, also from Batu Merah Dalam. On January 19, 1999, the van had been 
individually hired or rented. But Yopi refused to give some money from what he had 
received from renting the van to the conductor, who asked for the money on behalf of the 
van’s owner. In addition to his refusal to pay any money, Yopi who was accompanied by 
other passengers identified as Christians, was said to have threatened and attacked the 
conductor, who ran away, seeking reinforcement from his friends in Batu Merah Dalam 
to retaliate against Yopi. Eventually, that dispute led to a confrontation between two large 
groups from the two villages, which degenerated quickly into a large-scale ethnic conflict 
in Maluku.28 
Both versions of the initial dispute spread among the Moslems, both migrants and 
indigenous, and among the Christian Ambonese in Ambon City. This conflict eventually 
spread to other islands around Maluku, with both sides blaming the other for provoking 
the conflict. A Human Rights Watch investigation in Maluku summarizes the two 
versions in this way: 
One, circulated by the legal team representing Christian detainees, 
portrays a Christian Ambonese public transport driver, Jacob Leuhery, 
otherwise known as Yopi, as the victim of harassment by two Bugis 
Muslims, Usman and Salim. A second version, circulated by the fact-
finding team of the Mollucan branch of a Muslim political party, the 
Justice Party, portrays the Bugis as the victims of intimidation by Yopi.29 
                                                 
27 Human Right Watch. “Indonesia: The Violence in Maluku.” op. cit., p. 11. 
28 Ibid., p. 12. 
29 Ibid., p. 11. 
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Yopi was finally arrested by police on charges of lashing out at the Bugis youth. 
However, when interviewed by a Human Rights Watch Team in Ambon, Yopi held to his 
own version of how the dispute occurred.30  
Following that episode, conflicts in Ambon worsened, especially after several 
mosques and churches were burned to the ground by the opposing sides. The conflict at 
that time had not only erupted in Ambon but had also spread rapidly to the village of 
Hila, several dozen kilometers from Ambon. Meanwhile, in Ambon itself, the violence 
reached a peak in such places as Batu Gantung, Waringin, Benteng Karang, Passo, Nania, 
Wailete, Hative Besar and other locales. After a few days of initial outbreak, the people 
quickly divided along the lines of the two major religious groups, the Ambonese 
Christians and the Ambonese Moslems, who were allied with Moslem migrants, that is, 
Buton, Bugis, and Makasar migrants (the BBM).  They two groups, Moslem and 
Christian, attacked each other. On the one hand, Christians deliberately assaulted and 
burned down Moslems migrant’s properties, such as markets and shops where the 
Moslem-Butonese and Bugis were mostly concentrated.  They skipped Chinese 
properties, however, because the majority of them are Christians.  On the other hand, 
Moslems attacked and also burned down some Christian villages.  As a result several 
mosques and churches were reportedly burned to the ground, and some cars, motorbikes, 
and buildings were also destroyed. In addition, it was estimated that several people from 
both sides had died in Ambon, and thus city-wide destruction was apparently inevitable.31  
On February 3, 1999, as the deadly conflict in Ambon spread to neighboring 
islands in Central Maluku. Christians equipped with sharp weapons attacked Moslems 
who had been invited to the preceding peaceful talks held in Kairatu, on Seram Island. In 
return, Moslems burned down Christian-owned houses in the village of Waisatu. 
Similarly, on Saparua Island, Christians and Moslems assaulted each other, which, in 
turn, led to mass mobilization on both sides. However, that confrontation was resolved 
through religious leaders’ efforts to calm down their people and contain the conflict. On 
February 14, 1999, a clash between Moslems from the hamlet of Pelau and Christians 
                                                 
30 Human Right Watch. “Indonesia: The Violence in Maluku,” op. cit., p. 11. 
31 Jacques Bertrand. “Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia’s Mollucan 
Islands.” Pacific Affairs. (Spring 2002), p. 75. 
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from Kariu, a neighboring village, erupted on Haruku, and approximately twenty-three 
people died altogether, from both sides. This conflict did not only involve Moslems and 
Christians from both Pelau and Kariu, but also Butonese and Ambonese Moslems from 
other places, who flew into the conflict areas to help the Moslems from Pelau. After the 
conflict’s escalation began to decreased, both sides accused security force members of 
siding with either the Moslem side or the Christian side during the conflict. For the first 
time, people in Maluku denounced the Indonesian security forces as biased in settling the 
conflict in Maluku.32   
After things had quieted down for about a month, people in Ambon began to fear 
the possibility of a renewed conflict. Their fear continued, due to ongoing violence 
around Ambon, in Haruku for example, and, indeed, was worsened by limited security 
guarantees from the military and the police. Scattered, small confrontations between 
Christians and Moslems, such as the communal clashes among people in Waai 
(Christians), Tulehu (Moslems), and Liang (Moslems), and the attack by a  small group 
on a couple of houses, including the house of Abdullah Soulina, the head of Al Fatah 
Mosque Foundation, were robust signs that conflict in Ambon might soon reach a peak.  
During the first week of March, Ambon became a “war zone” between Moslems from the 
village of Rinjani and Christians from the Ahuru quarter. Thirteen people were claimed to 
have been killed, and nine were wounded in the course of the clashes, due to police firing 
live ammunition into the crowd. Again, contradictory statements from both Christians 
and Moslems remained unresolved regarding the initial perpetrator who attacked either a 
mosque or in the Christian quarter in Ambon. Another incident, an attack on a nearby 
Silo church in Ambon City on March 6, 1999, also increased the tension within the 
community, which now, stood divided along a religious and ethnic dividing line.  Both 
sides began erecting roadblocks and armed themselves with sharp weapons and rifles to 
prevent the other side from attacking. Religious leaders in Ambon and Maluku could not 
prevent the people from attacking each other once again and hence, the conflict spread all 
over Ambon, until April 1999, mostly because the Indonesian security forces could not 
contain it.33  
                                                 
32 Jacques Bertrand. “Legacies,” op. cit., p. 77. 
33 Ibid., p. 78. 
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2.  Phase Two: July to December 1999  
A second large-scale phase of violence in Ambon erupted in early July of 1999 
when a Poka estate inhabited by multiethnic and multireligious populations was burned 
down by an unidentified group of people. The incident resulted in a confrontation 
between Christians and Moslems who viewed one another as the initial perpetrators of 
the conflict. Most of the shops and markets that were located on the border between the 
two factions, which became known as “Gaza Strip,” were burned, causing economic 
activities to cease completely in Ambon.  This conflict involved more people from both 
the Christian and the Moslem communities than ever before. Despite the start of this new 
conflict, Ambon quieted down for almost two months, and eventually reached a low point 
that permitted economic activities to increase gradually.34  
Nonetheless, the incidents at Ambon’s Silo Church and An-Nur Mosque in “Gaza 
Strip” profoundly affected people’s lives.  Memories of those incidents remained deep in 
people’s minds, renewing their hatred of the other side. The situation deteriorated even 
further when word spread in Ambon that Moslems were planning to take revenge against 
Christians. On the other hand, Christians heard rumors that there would be massive 
violence during December of 1999 when both Moslems and Christians celebrate holy 
days—Idul Fitri for Moslems and Christmas for Christians.  The rumors circulated 
among the Christians were believed because the conflict in January 1999 had erupted on 
the last day of Ramadhan, when Moslems celebrated Idul Fitri. Similarly, the more recent 
conflict, spread rapidly all over Ambon and to the surrounding islands: because it could 
not be contained and stopped by the local police and military forces. Moreover, people 
believed that it had been initiated by previous conflicts in North Maluku, Seram, Buru, 
Haruku, and Saparua, leading people on both sides to perceive the other as a most 
threatening enemy. By October 1999, the second conflict had extended to all of North 
Maluku, Ternate, Tidore, and Halmahera. It continued for almost six months, from July 
to December, 1999, longer than the first one. As a result, many people were displaced 
and tension remained high throughout Ambon.35 
                                                 
34 Lambang Trijono. “Religious Communal Conflict,” op. cit., p. 6. 
35 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Rather than religious issues, the second conflict in Ambon and Maluku was 
triggered by a local issue that centered around the establishment of new territory. 
According to an account by the sociologist Thamrin Amal Tomagola, an expert on the 
Mollucan region, this conflict erupted right after the government issued a regulation 
indicating the creation of a new district, Malifut, in August 1999. The majority 
population in Malifut, located along the border between North and Central Halmahera, 
are Moslems. Thus people around this new district, who were Christians, disagree with 
the government’s decision to create the new district. According to the surrounding 
Christian, creating a new district, would caused them to lose control of that territorial 
area, and the spread of Christianity to Central Halmahera would be hindered. In protest of 
government’s decision, Christians initiated an assault on the Malifut district, which was 
inhabited by Makianese who had been relocated to Malifut in 1975 due to the threat of a 
potential volcanic eruption in their native location.36 
By the time the second conflict ended, casualties on both sides had mounted. In 
November 1999, it was believed that twenty people had died during a series of 
confrontations in the cities of Tidore and Ternate. Furthermore, approximately 907 
altogether, from both sides, lost their lives between December 26 and early January, 
2000, when deadly attacks occurred in North Halmahera, Tobelo, Galela, and Jailolo, 
where Christians are in the majority.37 In all, during the communal religious conflict in 
1999, at least 1,500 people were thought to have died while later statistical data suggests 
the toll may have been as high as 4,000.38 Eventually, due to the intense communal 
religious conflict in Molucca that erupted throughout 1999, the Indonesian government 
decided to send more troops and police into that tense area. Their main tasks were to 
prevent future outbreaks and disperse the fighting and gang ferocity throughout Molucca. 
In November 1999, the government also considered announcing “a state of civil  
                                                 
36 Jacques Bertrand. Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 129-130. 
37 Ibid., p. 129. 
38 Armed Conflict Report. “Indonesia-Molucca,” op. cit., p. 5. 
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emergency” in Ambon in order to prevent military forces and police from taking sides in 
the conflict, which people from both sides, Moslems and Christians, claimed that the 
military and police were doing.39 
3.  Phase Three: April 2000 to 2004 
The Indonesian government’s decision near the end of 1999 to send more troops 
and police as reinforcements for local security forces resulted in the de-escalation of the 
conflict in Maluku. Ambon was relatively peaceful from January to April of 2000. Those 
temporary peaceful conditions, if they can be called that, were more superficial than it 
appeared, leading people to have a false sense of security. Mutual trust and reconciliation 
among the people of Maluku was still not achieved. However, sending more troops and 
police to Ambon to deter both sides, Christian and Moslem, from initiating future 
conflicts proved effective.40 Nonetheless, Maluku remained fragile, even though social 
and economic activities were gradually resumed during January to April 2000.    
The cooling-off period in Maluku once again lasted only a short time however. By 
April 2000, large religious communal conflicts broke out again many times. Several 
Moslems and Christians lost their lives, and four Christian youths were seized and held in 
Moslems strongholds. Many people consider the April 2000 conflict as the culmination 
of the entire bloody conflict since the first eruption in January 1999. There are many 
explanations for the third phase of the conflict, but the dispute at becak (tricycle) rally 
between Moslems and Christian youths passing by the Moslem village of Waihaong on 
their way to celebrate a “peace” fete was what most people thought triggered the conflict. 
Furthermore there were two possible explanations why the becak  rally dispute may have 
stirred up new confrontations. First, the tricycle rally passed through Moslem Waihaong 
at sundown, the time when most Moslems offer their evening prayers. So, they 
considered this offensive and religiously impolite behavior.  Second, for Moslems, a 
becak was a sensitive occasion: its primarily purpose was to earn money. Furthermore, it 
reminded Moslems of the initial conflict in January 1999, when Moslems lost most of 
their becak because of the conflict. Subsequently, they thought that the Christians had, in  
                                                 
39 Armed Conflict Report. “Indonesia-Molucca,” op. cit., p. 4. 
40 Lambang Trijono. “Religious Communal Conflict,” op. cit., p. 7. 
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effect, stolen their becaks during the first conflict. Since then, tensions between Moslems 
and Christians have heightened and tend to return the people in Ambon to massive 
clashes.41 
The third phase of conflict in Maluku differed from the first and second phases. 
According to both Moslems and Christians, the involvement of external forces, the local 
radical religious leaders and military and police members who allegedly took sides in the 
conflict, became more salient.  Furthermore, the central issues in the ongoing bloody 
conflict in Maluku were broadcast all over the country. Hence more people started paying 
more attention to supporting a particular religious group or urged the government to 
implement overall reconciliation in Maluku. The main issues were the deaths of  five 
hundred Moslems and the forcing of another 10,000 people to become refugees as a 
result of the deadly battle between Moslems and Christians in December 1999 in the 
northern part of Halmahera Island. Coupled with an incident in which several hundred 
Moslems were forced to convert to Christianity in North Maluku, this encouraged 
external forces, such as Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warriors) and Laskar Mujahiddin from Java 
to send members to help the Moslem people in Maluku.42 At the same time, in North, 
Maluku and Maluku in 2000, thousands of Christians were impelled to convert to Islam. 
The intensifying activities of Laskar Jihad in confronting the Christian community 
triggered indigenous Christian Ambonese in December 2000 to form the Maluku 
Sovereignty Forum (FKM)43 in order to fight against Laskar Jihad and the whole Moslem 
population. In the meantime, both retired and active military and police members 
allegedly provided military training for both sides and helped them to fight against each 
other. These new dynamics eventually intensified the conflict. As a result, Ambon 
became a city of war for Christians and Moslems, where weapons, explosives, hand-
made weapons, and other deadly weapons were easily distributed between opposing 
groups. 
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This situation, in which many more factions on both sides were getting involved, 
it only made the violence more intense than ever before in Maluku. Moreover, in addition 
to the open conflict between Moslems and Christians, during the third phase, cases of 
sniping increased dramatically in Maluku. Relatively minor incidents, such as the 
shooting of a prominent political sub-district leader from the Islamic Political Party 
(PKS), Abdullah Daeng Matta, on April 26, 2000; the sniper murder of two members of 
the mobile brigade (an elite police unit) on April 27, 2000; and another sniper killing of 
two Moslem youths in the village of Waringin on April 28, 2000, were all signs of the 
uncertain security circumstances in Maluku due to the deadly intense conflict. The 
presence of snipers also proved people’s accusation of alleged military and police 
involvement in the conflict. Within a single week in April 2000, sniper attacks killed 
more than thirty people, twenty-two of whom were Moslems.44  Even though police and 
military forces found and captured several snipers, snipers continued to threaten and kill 
both civilians and security force members in Maluku. However, after 2000, Maluku 
calmed down. 
In this section, I will summarize the rest of the Maluku conflict chronology 
ending with the year 2004. In 2001, the conflict was contained and the number of 
incidents decreased, though sporadic communal clashes between Moslems and Christians 
still occurred. The number of deaths due to the conflict also decreased, reaching the 
lowest number ever. Unfortunately, a final peace during 2001 was unattainable because 
the Moslems refused to join in peace talks with the Christians and threatened the 
moderate Moslems who wanted to end the conflict.45 
In February of 2002, peace in Maluku province between Christians and Moslems 
was within sight. A peace agreement brought about more peaceful conditions than in the 
previous year. However after a few months, the peace agreement was no longer working, 
since Laskar Jihad had launched an attack against Christians in Ambon.46 In the following 
year, conditions in Maluku were little different than the previous year. Nonetheless, 
security conditions were getting much better, and there were no signs of conflict in 
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Maluku throughout 2003. The internally displaced persons (IDP), however, who had been 
living in refugee camps all over the province remained there47 and were still confronted 
by traumatic conflict. 
In April 2004, ethnic conflict in Maluku broke out again. And this time, the clash 
between Moslems and Christians was followed by arson and bombings that resulted in at 
least forty deaths. Although tension between Christians and Moslems remained high for 
the next few months, no major conflict was reported. The issue of the internally displaced 
persons, however, remained a major problem for local governments. Approximately 
200,000 IDP who were in refugee camps desperately wanted to repatriate.48 From late 
2004 onward, Maluku has remained peaceful. The Indonesia Armed Forces and Police 
have control over security, martial law and curfews have been lifted and authority has 
been restored to civilians. Nonetheless, scattered minor conflicts among the people of 
Maluku are still ongoing, and Moslems and Christians still maintain live within a 
dividing line. This kind of societal segregation forces military and police members to set 
up bases in the middle as a neutral zone,49 giving people a way to interact without 
security concerns. 
C.  THE UNDERLYING FACTORS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT  
The previous section explained how conflict initially occurred in Ambon, the 
capital of Maluku province, in early 1999 and how it subsequently spread to other 
regions. In this section, I will explore the underlying factors in 1998 that made Maluku 
especially susceptible to ethnic conflict.  
By “underlying factors,” as used here I mean the nature of the disputes and 
differences among the people in Maluku that arguably led to the conflict. This discussion 
of underlying factors will deal with political disputes, economic/social tensions, religious 
differences, cultural differences, and tribal disputes among the people of Maluku. These 
factors, which had greatly increased societal tension in Maluku for years before the  
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eventual outbreak of conflict, I argue, were the causes of the bloody ethnic confrontations 
in Maluku. I will begin by looking at these underlying factors from a political 
perspective. 
1.  Political Disputes  
Many people in Indonesia contend that the collapse of President Soeharto’s 
administration in 1998 was one of the main causes of ethnic conflict in Indonesia, 
particularly in Maluku. This is mainly because the Soeharto regime’s collapse led to 
political chaos in almost all parts the country. Thus, in the case of the Maluku conflict, 
most Indonesia politicians believed that it was a political conflict between elites who 
were pro the status quo and who used religion as a vehicle to challenge the incumbent 
government and the elites who wanted Indonesia to move toward becoming a more 
democratic country.  This argument is supported by the fact that some Indonesian leaders, 
such as Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid), the former President, also declared that conflict 
in Maluku was not religious, but rather, political. In addition, Megawati, the Vice 
President, Amien Rais, The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, and Akbar Tanjung, 
The Speaker of the House of Representatives all also emphasized that the conflict in 
Maluku was a political conflict that involved some political elites in Jakarta.50 
Some argue that political conflict in Maluku was conducted by particular political 
elites and military officers who lost influence and power when President Gus Dur was 
elected. They pursued their political agendas by provoking conflict in an effort to 
undermine and destabilize the government under Gus Dur’s leadership.51  The argument 
regarding the involvement of civilians and the military with links to former Indonesian 
President Soeharto were further supported by the Indonesian Defense Minister, Juwono 
Sudarsono.52  However such arguments have never been proven, due to a lack of 
evidence, and the alleged provocateurs were never arrested.   
To better understand how political tensions in Indonesia in general and in Maluku 
in particular led to the ethnic conflict of 1999, it is useful to look briefly at Indonesian 
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history. During the Dutch colonialization period in Maluku, from the sixteenth to the 
twentieth centuries, the Dutch granted their favor to the Ambonese Christians, proving 
better education for them and recruiting them as administrators in the Dutch company. 
Ambonese Christians who lacked a higher education were often provided jobs in the 
Dutch Army, the KNIL, and eventually became the majority group in the Army at that 
time.  The Dutch political discrimination marginalized the Ambonese Moslems in the 
state bureaucratic system and isolated them from Dutch institutions. And the Ambonese 
Moslems, who lived mostly in the countryside, had little contact with the Ambonese 
Christians.53  Some historians believe that it was the Dutch political favoritism was the 
genesis of tension among the Ambonese in terms of their political disputes.  
During the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945, Japan also created an 
underlying tension but in reverse. The Japanese favored the Ambonese Moslems and 
appointed them to serve on the staffs of their institutions, which resulted in the 
displacement of large numbers of Ambonese Christians from bureaucratic and military 
positions.  In addition, Japan provided education and military training for Ambonese 
Moslems, to enhance their ability in staffing institutions and running the Japanese 
military base in Maluku. There was little explanation at the time why Japan favored 
Moslems over Christians. Looking back, one explanation of the  Japanese political, 
administrative policy could be that it was  part of Japan’s general divide-and-conquer 
policy, typically used by colonialist to weaken indigenous people. Again, the Ambonese 
population experienced tension created by political disputes that were the result of 
colonial policies. 
Even after Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, these tensions among the 
populace due to political disputes in Ambon continued to exist. At the time, the disputes 
involved two basic groups: those who wanted Maluku to be part of the unitary State of 
Indonesia proclaimed by President Soekarno, and those who opposed joining the unitary 
state.  Around 1950, therefore, a secessionist movement occurred, and the government in 
Maluku called the area the Republic of South Molucca (RMS). Most government 
members were Ambonese Christians, the majority of whom rallied for the former Dutch 
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Army, KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlanddsch-Indidisch Leger, or Royal Dutch East Indies 
Army). They viewed the current unitary state of Indonesia as a Moslem-majority country 
and feared that Christians would lose their political leverage in the future. President 
Soekarno rejected the secessionist movement and sent troops to Maluku to crush the 
newly created Republic. In 1963, the RMS’s actions were significantly reduced and many 
RMS members fled to the Netherlands, and where they created a government in exile.54 
In 1965, President Soeharto came to power, right after an abortive coup conducted 
by the Indonesian Communist Party. During the 1970s and 1980s, President Soeharto 
achieved tremendous economic development, even though his political policies were 
deemed repressive, marginalizing Moslem political expression within state institutions all 
over the country. Had tensions not increased among those at the state level and had 
President Soeharto not favored a particular group of people, the conflict between 
Moslems and Christians may not have been rekindled.  In the 1990s, for the first time, 
Soeharto created a policy that favored Moslems and was intended to gain their support in 
the next election. For instance, he appointed the first Moslem, Saleh Latuconsina as 
Maluku governor. After that, the political composition in Maluku began to change and 
many Christians were replaced by Moslems in regional state institutions as well. But 
during 1999, in contrast to President Soeharto’s policy, President Megawati, through her 
political party, the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), restored the 
Ambonese Christian political domination in Maluku. Her party, which consisted mostly 
of Ambonese Christians, won the general election and made her the fourth Indonesian 
president, replacing President Wahid.55  
I believe that conflict in Maluku cannot be separated from the political issues that 
I have traced, all the way back to the colonial period. Every time a regime collapsed in 
Indonesia, the tension among the people increased significantly, particularly in Maluku. 
Each time, conflicts broke out and led to an eruption of ethnic conflict between the 
Ambonese Christians and the Ambonese Moslems. This argument is supported by 
Michael Brown’s writings, which note that a “weak state” is a starting point for analyzing 
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ethnic conflict.56 In his article, “The Challenges of Managing International Conflict,” 
political disputes are the main issues he discusses. Brown argues that a lack of political 
legitimacy and state’s inability to deal with their internal affairs will result in weak states 
and eventually lead to the breaking out of ethnic conflict. This condition of a weak state, 
as portrayed by Brown, parallels the political conditions that existed within Indonesia 
before the bloody ethnic conflict in Maluku finally erupted in early 1999.  It is clear that 
political disputes either at the state level or the regional level have increased tensions 
among the populace in Maluku who wanted to have more direct access to political 
leverage. As a result, in the case of Maluku, the ensuing ethnic conflict was inevitable. 
2.  Economic and Social Disparities 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Maluku faced a mass influx of migrants from other 
provinces. Most were from Bali, Java, Madura, and Sulawesi. It is estimated that 
approximately one-third of the Ambonese populations during the 1990s were migrants.57  
Then, ensuing economic tension due to the changing societal composition in Maluku 
began to mount among the people. In addition, the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 
1997 seriously worsened the Indonesian economy. Some people in Indonesia argue that 
the prolonged economic crisis after 1997 led to economic disputes and further provoked 
the ethnic conflict in Maluku. The basis for this argument is explained by Brown in an 
article about states’ internal ethnic conflicts. He points out that ethnic conflict may occur 
in a state due to diverse economic/social factors: “economic problems, discriminatory 
economic systems, and the trials and tribulations of economic development and 
modernization.”58 Generally speaking, the argument about economic/social factors can 
also be applied to Indonesia. 
To begin, this section will focus on the desperate economic situation that 
Indonesia has faced since 1997. Though it is impossible to tell whether Indonesia 
experienced economic stagnation or not, the country’s devaluation of its currency rate in 
1999 essentially proved that Indonesia was facing a severe economic problem at that 
time. The exchange rate for the Indonesian rupiah dramatically dropped from around Rp 
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2,500.00 for one U.S. dollar in 1996 to around Rp 17,000 in 1999. The situation 
apparently created economic tension among Indonesians. Furthermore, in Maluku, the 
change in the societal composition due to the mass influx of migrants created additional 
economic tensions between the newcomers and the indigenous people. As Bartels says in 
his 1977 Ph.D. dissertation, “Guarding the Invisible Mountain: Intervillage Alliances, 
Religious Syncretism and Ethnic Identity among Ambonese Christians and Moslems in 
the Moluccas,” prolonged conflict between migrants and indigenous Ambonese is caused 
by people’s struggle for “scarcer resources of village-land.”59 In addition, migrants in 
Maluku—commonly known as Bugese, Butonese, and Makassar (BBM)—also held 
positions dominating regional economic aspects such as staple retails, public transports, 
and other economic activities in Maluku. The indigenous people saw migrants as a threat, 
because they were overwhelming them in their own land.60 Finally, competition for 
scarce resources between indigenous people and migrants spawned renewed ethnic 
conflict in Maluku.61 
Second, a discriminatory economic system within a state may result in internal 
ethnic conflict. When people start looking at economic growth as an illegitimate 
possession and as inequality, the outcome of such a discriminatory economic system can 
be extensive. This is what Jon Goss refers to in his article “Understanding the ‘Maluku 
Wars.’” According to Gross, writing about that earlier period, “economic resources are 
distributed unequally between the two respective segments (in this case indigenous 
Christians Ambonese and Moslem migrants)”62 This can cause sectarian conflict to occur, 
as it has in Maluku. In addition, the creation of a new district, Malifut, in Maluku in 
August 1999 by the central government may explain how a discriminatory economic 
system came to be in Maluku. Malifut is a Moslem district overall, but, it contains a 
number of preponderantly Christian Kao and Pagu villages. Thus, according to the 
indigenous people, this new district is providing newcomers with subsidies and is 
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creating a new district that has the potential for being a lucrative goldmine for migrants, 
because the central government has a policy that shows favoritism toward Moslem 
migrants.63 Nevertheless, the indigenous people’s perception of the central government’s 
policies is not always accurate. Further evidence is needed to prove such accusations of 
the central government’s favoritism, although in the Malifut case, they may be true. 
A final factor that contributes to current social/economic problems is economic 
development and modernization, which have substantially affected people’s lives in 
Maluku. The development of technology in transportation significantly increased the 
number of migrants in Maluku during the period from the 1970s to 1980s, while, at the 
same time, communication technology provided people with easier access to various 
media for various purposes. Providing a better education for migrants is another 
implication that technology is advancing. All these factors, coupled with the economic 
crisis during the 1990s, particularly in Maluku, have increased tension between the 
indigenous people and the migrants in terms of economics. This tension is mainly due to 
migrant achievements and competition with the indigenous people. The ongoing 
economic tension, whether people realize it or not, has created the grounds for further 
ethnic conflict in Maluku.  And the large number of unemployed youth, the omnipresence 
of hoodlums, and the social disorder64 due to this continued economic crisis could also 
spark further ethnic conflict at any time. Therefore, the government needs to take steps to 
improve the situation there for everyone. 
3.  Religious Differences  
Nobody denies that ethnic conflict in Maluku eventually became a communal 
religious conflict. Although the conflict resulted initially from a confrontation between an 
Ambonese Christian and a Moslem migrant, it rapidly turned into religious conflict after 
the burning of several mosques and churches.  Eventually, indigenous Moslems also got 
involved, joining the Moslem migrants in fighting against the Ambonese Christians.65   
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Thus, although religion did not play a major role in starting the Maluku conflict, once it 
began, people used the religious issues to provoke others as much as possible to engage 
in the conflict. 
Some people believe that religious tension between Christians and Moslems in 
Maluku is a carryover from their colonial legacy; others perceive the tension as a result of 
President Soeharto’s policy of favoritism toward Moslems during the 1990s. Bertrand 
and Hefner, in the article of “Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia,” support the 
latter argument, stating that the rise of Moslem leverage in the political arena within 
regional and local governments in the 1990s started creating religious tension in 
Maluku.66  In contrast, Umar Tuasikal, an Islamic activist based in Java, suggests that the 
conflict in Maluku is “a continuation of Christian crusades and modern imperialism, part 
of a historical project to convert Moslems and appropriate their resources.”67  In more 
radical terms, Rustam Kastor, a Moluccan native, argues that the conflict in Maluku is a 
conspiracy involving “the RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan, or South Maluku Republic) in 
the Netherlands, the GPM (Gereja Protestan Maluku, or the Protestant Church of 
Maluku), and the local Chapter of the ‘Christians-Nationalist’ PDI-P.” He claims that “it 
is part of a global Jewish-Christian conspiracy against umat Islam.”68 The latter two 
arguments, given by Umar and Kastor, demonstrate clearly that the conflict in Maluku is 
a conflict between Moslems and Christians. 
On the other hand, there are those who believed that the Maluku conflict is not a 
religious conflict at all. One such proponent is Rev. John Ruhulesi, a Moluccan native, 
who states that: 
We all feel that the root of the conflict is not religion, since we had been 
living side by side with them (the Moslems)…but there has been a sense 
that we have been economically marginalized, and an anxiety for external 
political suppression amongst indigenous Ambonese that are mostly 
adherents of Christianity…Nevertheless, the social unrest was a blessing 
in disguise…Following the unrest they (the Christians) became more  
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independent in the economic sector, even now many of them 
unhesitatingly have become becak drivers (three-wheeled vehicles), 
occupation thus far handled by migrants and Moslems.69 
In other words, Ruhulesi believes that the conflict in Maluku tends to be a 
competition between Moslems and Christians over economic issues. 
In contrast, another Moluccan native who perceives the Maluku conflict as a 
religious conflict is cited by Agus Watimmena: “This is a religious war.” However, Jon 
Goss claims that the Maluku conflict is a conflict that involves people who use religion as 
justification for violence, which is evidence of people’s “false consciousness.”70 
The diverse arguments about the Maluku conflict, whether it is a religious conflict 
or not, continue to prevail in people’s minds in Maluku, particularly, since the 1990s 
when the government started encouraging Moslems to re-engage in political matters. 
Both religious groups became deeply curious about one another. On the one hand, 
Moluccan Christians have a heightened fear of what might happen if Moluccan Moslems 
take control of Maluku. They fear that they will lose their previous domination within all 
strata of life. On the other hand, Moslems have deemed this chance to gain power as a 
way for them to catch up with Christians who up until now have marginalized them from 
having state institution jobs and gaining economic opportunities. Furthermore, the real 
instance of conflict between Christians and Moslems in Maluku during the 1990s was 
clearly reflected by the people in power who were struggling for two major positions, that 
of the Mayor of Ambon and that of  the University’s Chairman of Pattimura. The struggle 
was important because it would reveal who would determine future dominance between 
Christians and Moslems within Maluku society.71 
Finally, as has been pointed out, the Maluku conflict is not totally a religious 
conflict. Other factors such as economic disparities and political disputes have caused the 
conflict to become a religious communal conflict. The presence of religious differences 
among the Mollucan populace should not cause us to conclude that those differences 
inevitably trigger conflicts. Many people believe that the religious issues have been 
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politicized and manipulated for the advantage and political agenda of certain groups of 
people in Maluku. However, the role of religion in preserving people from committing 
irrational actions, such as humiliation, mutilation, and killing, has failed.  This 
phenomenon reminds us that people need to learn more about their own religion if they 
are to live side by side peacefully with more tolerance of one another. This may be the 
most important lesson to be learned from the Maluku conflict that erupted in 1999.  
4.  Cultural Differences  
The cultural differences among the population in Maluku, even though they have 
not contributed greatly to the Maluku conflict, are nonetheless of essential importance in 
this discussion. Brown argues in “The Challenges of Managing International Conflict,” 
for example, that cultural differences, to a certain extent, will not cause ethnic conflict 
until “cultural discrimination against minorities”72 exists within a society and is 
omnipresent.  He points out also that, in many extreme cases, bringing a large number of 
a particular ethnic group into a minority group’s territory in order to assimilate them 
culturally can also lead to ethnic conflict.73 In the case of the Maluku conflict, cultural 
differences seem to have become more conspicuous since the mass influx of migrants 
from different provinces dramatically increased in the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus, 
cultural differences without appropriate understanding by both the indigenous people and 
the migrants may contribute to ethnic conflict. 
Although the cultural differences in Maluku have been very few in numbers, 
nevertheless, they can generate ethnic conflict such as that which erupted in Hativa Besar 
village on December 12, 1998. As Betrand notes, at conflict, which broke out between 
Christian youths and government soldiers at a village dance party, was due to cultural 
differences.  And it was also followed by the destruction of a few communal houses in 
the village. When Moslem migrants and certain individuals from other areas came to 
Maluku, they tended not to accept Ambonese Christian values, which included the 
allowance of ballroom dancing and drinking alcohol, which for Moslems is forbidden. 
Fortunately, the conflict eventually was settled “through traditional appeals and inter-
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cultural tolerance.”74 Therefore, we cannot entirely deny that cultural differences among 
the people in Maluku may provide a breeding ground for ethnic conflict. 
5.  Tribal Disputes 
Lambang Trijono’s article, “Religious Communal Conflict and Multi-Track 
Resolution: Lesson from Ambon, Indonesia,” describe how conflict in Maluku initially 
occurred between Ambonese Christians and Moslem migrants commonly known as 
BBM: Bugese, Butonese, and Makassar tribes. It is now clear that that conflict, which 
erupted in January 1999, was a tribal dispute between the indigenous people and migrants 
that was triggered by economic problems.  However, during the course of the conflict, the 
tribal issue was replaced by religious issues, which, in turn, led to a wider conflict. 
Furthermore some believe that the replacement of tribal issues with religious issues 
during the next phase of the conflict was an attempt to engage more people in the 
conflict.75  Thus, we can say that, to a certain degree, tribal disputes in the Maluku 
conflict, have indeed contributed to ethnic conflicts, but were not enough to bring more 
people into the conflict. 
Long before ethnic confrontation erupted in Maluku, ethnic tension was an 
integral part of the social and cultural interaction of the people. Occurrences of prejudice   
by both nonmigrants (anak dagang) and migrants (anak negeri) were a common feature of 
the people’s daily social activities. Moreover, after the initial conflict, both the migrant 
and the indigenous peoples were given labels that focused more on their religious identity 
than on their social or ethnic status: Christians were labeled “Red,” or “Obet,” Moslems 
were called “White,” or “Acang.” The name-labels widened the gap not only between 
indigenous people and migrants, but also between Ambonese Christians and Ambonese 
Moslems. Ultimately, the intra and intertribe disputes led to a bloody ethnic conflict in 
Maluku that caused between 300 and 400 deaths by early 2000, more than half of which 
occurred over several days in other parts of North Maluku.76 The death toll had increased 
to more than 4,000 people by 2004. 
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How the tribal disputes in Maluku have contributed to a large scale of ethnic 
conflict is an issue that is thoroughly examined by Donald Rothchild and David A. Lake 
in their article, “Containing Fear: The origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict” : 
“When central state authority declines, groups become fearful for their survival. They 
invest in and prepare for violence, and thereby make actual violence possible.”77  In 
regard to the failure of agencies within a state to share information, they argue, “when 
information failure occurs, groups cannot acquire or share information necessary to 
bridge the bargaining gap between themselves, making conflict possible.”78  Furthermore, 
they find that a “security dilemma” in tribal relations also can lead to ethnic conflict: 
“When incentives to use force preemptively are strong, a security dilemma takes hold and 
works its pernicious effects. Fearful that the other might preempt, a group has an 
incentive to strike first and negotiate later.”79  These arguments explain clearly how tribal 
tensions can escalate into tribal disputes and eventually lead to a larger-scale ethnic 
conflict.  Such situations of potential tribal disputes between migrants and indigenous 
people are precisely what existed in Maluku before the outbreak of ethnic conflict in 
1999. 
D.  THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSES 
During the first phase of the conflict in January of 1999, the central government 
was accused of not taking serious measures to quell the conflict in Maluku. President B.J. 
Habibie initially responded by forming a special military team led by Brigadier General 
Suaidi Marasabesi,80 which was sent to Maluku to settle the differences among groups. It 
was effective for a couple of months before the conflict erupted into a larger one. In 
1999, President B. J. Habibie was replaced by President Abdurrahman Wahid and during 
his presidency, Wahid delegated the responsibility to take control over the Maluku 
conflict to his vice president, Megawati.  
President Gus Dur came to power after winning the general election in 1999. One 
month later, the security conditions in Maluku began to deteriorate. The transitional 
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government under Gus Dur’s leadership was not yet strong enough to eliminate or 
terminate the ethnic conflict. Moreover, the accusation that he was not serious enough in 
taking fundamental steps toward resolving the conflict later became more vigorous, after 
December 12, 1999, when he and Vice President Megawati went to Maluku. There, 
President Gus Dur stated that the Maluku conflict had to be settled by the Moluccans 
themselves. Thus the central government merely facilitated the reconciliation toward 
peace and vice president Megawati only asked people to stop fighting each other, because 
it would lead all sides to suffer themselves.81 As a result, the government took no 
significant measures in 1999 to resolve the conflict. 
At the beginning of 2000, the Maluku conflict escalated dramatically, and ethnic 
conflicts resulted in many casualties and damage to a lot of property. At this point, the 
central government no longer had control over Maluku, which was already devastated by 
the conflict. However, President Gus Dur still did not want to declare martial law, which 
many experts had suggested. He did not want to set a new precedent for the military to 
gain back its power, which had dramatically declined since President Soeharto’s 
resignation.  Forced by the escalating conflict, the government’s lose of control over the 
ground troops in Maluku, Gus Dur ultimately declared martial law.  Starting on June 26, 
2000, he also reinstalled several regional leaders to take control under military 
supervisors, Saleh Latuconsina, the governor of Maluku, and Abdul Muhyi Effendie, the 
governor of North Maluku. To establish the notion that the “military was neutral” among 
the Moluccan people, Gus Dur replaced the former Pattimura military regional 
commander (KODAM Pattimura), Brigadier General Max Tamaela, a Christians, with 
Brigadier General I Made Yasa, (a Hindu).82  The new regulations set up by the central 
government gave a lot of power to the military and police leaders to take important 
measures to end the conflict, while leaving it “still under civilian control.”83  
Contrary to practice, but in keeping with the constitutional law established in 
1959 regarding imposing martial law, the military commander would have full authority 
to control the civilian leaders. In the Maluku case, the law could not be either applied or 
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rejected. Thus, the governor, as the local civilian authority directly gave orders and 
control to the local police to conduct several important measures to halt the conflict: the 
control of local radio stations, a ban on demonstrations and people’s gathering in large 
groups, the imposition of curfews, and the conducting of the search operations. Unlike 
the situation in North Maluku, in Maluku province, the establishment of a curfew was 
followed by a ban on more than ten people gathering for any specific purpose. 
Furthermore, the local government asked people to hand over all their weapons within 
thirty days. Nevertheless, notwithstanding martial law, the conflict in Maluku continued, 
and on July 4, 2000, Pattimura University, the largest university in Maluku was attacked 
by Moslems who believed that Christians were producing weapons in the university.84  It 
soon became clear that national and local leaders needed to enhance their efforts to 
establish peace. 
The imposition of martial law in Maluku and North Maluku was not fully 
effective in settling the conflict. Although there was a significant reduction in the degree 
of conflict, several groups of people from outside entered Maluku and the North Maluku 
Province, and peace was only foreseeable. On January 26, 2002, inspired by the peace 
agreement between Moslems and Christians in Poso in Central Sulawesi, the government 
sent two of its ministers, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Yusuf Kalla, to this hot spot 
area. Their main task was to call for permanent peace in the Maluku archipelago by 
conducting peace talks between Moslems and Christians, the same as was done by  
people in Poso in Central Sulawesi in December 2001. The first peace talks held in 
Makasar, South Sulawesi, on January 30, 2002, resulted in an agreement to hold a second 
meeting in February 2002.85  
Since Yusuf Kalla, the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare, (Indonesia’s 
current vice president) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Coordinating Minister for 
Political and Security Affairs, (Indonesia’s current President), met with the warring 
parties in Maluku in February 2002. “A government-sponsored cease-fire” was signed by 
both sides, Moslems and Christians.86 The peace accord demanded the creation of two 
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joint commissions to deal with security and socio-economic affairs, disarmed both 
warring sides, and asked “outsiders” such as Laskar Jihad to leave Maluku Province.87 
Although dissenting opinions between Moslems and Christians regarding who had 
initiated the first conflict in 1999 still existed, even after the peace accord was signed, 
social and economic conditions in Maluku are now better than in previous years. 
Following the peace accord, government law enforcement in Maluku was also eradicated 
and resulted in the seizure of several from both sides, of which more than seventeen 
activists were from the Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM), including its leader, Alex 
Manuputy, who later escaped and now lives in exile in the United States and the leader of 
Laskar Jihad, Ustadz Jafar Umar Thalib.88 On September 15, 2003, the Indonesian 
government lifted martial law, and the police now have full authority to restore and 
maintain law and order in Maluku and North Maluku. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
In 1997, Indonesia began experiencing severe economic crises and in 1998, 
President Soeharto’s administration collapsed and he was replaced by President B.J. 
Habibie. The transitional government tried to accommodate Indonesian reform demands, 
which primarily asked the existing government to embrace a more democratic system. 
After striking changes occurred, on January 19, 1999, Maluku experienced a tremendous 
ethnic conflict that immediately spread throughout the islands and resulted in the 
Indonesian Armed Forces and Police losing control.  The toll of the conflict on both the 
Moslem and the Christian sides combined is estimated to be approximately 5,000 people 
who died and more than 700,000 who were displaced. In short, the combination of the 
economic crisis in 1997, the collapse of President Suharto’s regime in 1998, and the 
sudden shift to a more democratic system during the transitional period resulted in 
political and economic chaos in Indonesia, evidence by several ethnic conflicts, such as 
that in Maluku. 
Among the underlying factors—political disputes, economic and social 
disparities, religious and cultural differences, and tribal disputes—several political and 
economic factors outweigh all others in terms of the triggering of the initial disputes in 
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Maluku. There is a strong correlation between the initial dispute and the escalation of 
political and economic tension before the large ethnic conflict broke out in 1999. The 
change in the balance of power in local government, between Moslems and Christians or 
migrants and local people, and the increase in unemployment after the economic crisis in 
1997 particularly, created a tremendous social tension between migrants and indigenous 
people in Maluku. Hence, other factors such as religious and cultural differences and 
tribal disputes worked their repercussions in triggering more conflicts.  
Once the conflict erupted in 1999, the ethnic conflict quickly spread to other areas 
around Maluku without being halted by local governments and security forces. The 
conflict eventually became an open conflict between Moslems and Christians. The 
escalation of conflict occurred because the Indonesian government failed to settle initial 
disputes in accordance with existing law, which subsequently created frustration among 
the people who were fighting. As a result, people lost confidence in the government and, 
later, before the Malino accord was signed in 2002, hindered any possible government 
reconciliation efforts.  Since then, people in Maluku have lived segregated, according to 
their ethnicity and religion. Therefore, the conflict in Maluku is considered by many 
people to have been a religious conflict between Moslems and Christians, rather than an 
ethnic conflict between migrants and the indigenous people over political and economic 











III.  ETHNIC CONFLICT IN POSO: WHY DOES PEACE NO 
LONGER EXIST? 
 
Figure 4.   The Map of Sulawesi  (From: <www.pajak-
sulselra.go.id/profil.php?id=20> (accessed November 11, 2005)) 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Poso is a district in Central Sulawesi province in eastern Indonesia. Its capital city 
is Poso City, which is located on the gulf, a six-hour drive southeast of Palu, the capital 
city of Central Sulawesi province.89 According to demographic data in 1989, Poso covers 
an area of 28,000 km² and has a population of 555,306. In terms of religion, the 
population in Poso is divided into approximately 400,264 Moslems, 143,249 Protestants, 
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8,030 Hindus, 2,166 Catholics, and 1,597 Buddhists.90 The Moslems reside mostly in the 
cities and inshore villages, while a large part of the indigenous Protestants live in the 
highlands of the district of Poso.91 Compared to other districts in Central Sulawesi, Poso 
is a remote area in which, traditionally, people from different religions and cultural, 
economic, and educational backgrounds have lived in peace for years. 
In addition to  being surrounded by natural borders such as beaches and 
mountainous areas, Poso has administrative borders that are determined by Teluk Tomini 
and North Sulawesi Province in the north, South Sulawesi Province and Morowali 
Regency in the south, Banggai Regency and Teluk Tolo Water in the east, and Donggala 
Regency in the west.92 Over time, these natural and administrative borders have shifted 
according to the way the people in Poso have earned their livelihoods. According to the 
Indonesian Statistical Bureau, people in Poso work in diverse areas: 70.04 percent in 
agriculture, 10.08 percent in trading, 9.72 percent in public services, 4.53 percent  in the 
industrial sector, 2.31 percent in construction, 1.94 percent in communication, 0.46 
percent in mining, 0.11 percent in electricity and water services and 0.42 percent in 
financial sectors.  Poso Regency, in general, produces rattan, cacao, dammar, and kemiri 
as its nontimber forest products and has hard timber and processed timber as its forest 
products.93  In short, due to its natural beauty as well as its products, Poso has been a 
promised land for many migrants throughout history.  
Similar to Maluku, Poso is one of the main target islands that migrants can reach 
from other destinations around the Indonesian archipelago. Over the past several decades, 
the Dutch’s and Indonesian government’s policies toward transmigration programs have 
changed the structure and composition of the population in Poso. In 1973, President 
Suharto declared Central Sulawesi as one of ten new transmigration provinces. To 
support this program he built new migrant settlements and a very dangerous, steep and 
narrow road called the Trans-Sulawesi Highway. This highway was cut into and through 
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the rocky and steep mountain forests to ease the path for migrants. As a result, the 
highway and its settlements have attracted an influx of voluntary migrants, especially 
Moslem Bugese and Makassar people from South Sulawesi.94 Since then, Poso Regency 
has become a place for migrants, coming from both densely and lesser populated areas, 
such as Java, Madura, Bali, and South Sulawesi. 
Before 1998, people in Poso lived peacefully side by side. That harmonious life is 
best described by the following testimonials from people in Poso. One Poso resident 
named Benny, now a refugee in Sedoa village, said that “they,” Moslems and Christians 
“used to live in one big melting pot.”  Lebron, the secretary of the Calvary Church 
congregation in Sangginore, Poso, stated that peace reigned in Poso in the past when 
religious holidays such as Idul Fitri, Christmas, and New Year were celebrated. At such 
times, he, his family, and his friends would go to Poso City to bring “Nasi Jaha,” 
Glutinous rice cooked in young bamboo leaves, for their Moslem relatives and friends. 
They celebrated those religious days together by visiting each other. Now, he and his 
family miss such harmonious circumstances and hope that people in Poso will soon be 
able to live peacefully side by side as they used to.95 
In addition to their joint celebration of religious days, two traditional festivals, 
Dero and Padangku, also bound people firmly together in Poso. Dero is an art festival 
during which people—young and old, male and female—hold hands and form a circle 
while a local tune is played. Dero manifests a popular Poso saying: “Sintuvu Maroso,” 
which means “united and strong.”  It has become a basic principle for people, to resort to 
deliberations before making a decision. Dero applies not only to the indigenous peoples, 
but also to migrants such as the Javanese, Balinese, Maduranese and Bugese. Unlike 
Dero, Padangku is a customary rite, usually held after harvest time to express gratitude to 
God for the annual harvest. Traditionally, both festivals involved various religious and 
ethnic groups in Poso. Having such a diverse traditional culture, Poso was once an area 
where people had extreme pride in their religious harmony.96  Since the outbreak of 
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ethnic conflict in Poso in 1998, however, this area is no longer a peaceful place for 
people—especially Moslems and Christians—to live side by side. Now people are 
segregated along ethnic and religious lines and no longer have traditional festivals that 
allow different ethnic and religious groups of people to join together. As a result, the 
Dero performed by the Moslem community is no longer accompanied by Christians, and 
vice versa. 
In general, the Poso conflict reflects a phenomenon similar to what we saw in 
Maluku.  Most people agree that the resignation of President Suharto in 1998 and 
Indonesia’s severe economic crisis in 1997 caused ethnic conflicts to flare up in several 
regions. The collapse of the Suharto regime significantly reduced Jakarta’s power to 
control the huge Indonesian archipelago both economically and politically. This 
phenomenon can be best understood by looking at several national conditions that existed 
from about 1998 onward: the ongoing Indonesian economic crisis (since 1997), the rise 
of separatist movements, severe social unrest and several deadly ethnic conflicts. 
Furthermore, the notion of “living in uniformity” that was emphasized by the New Order, 
rather than the former “unity in diversity,” fueled ethnic conflicts throughout Indonesia. 
And the condition of uncertainty following the departure of President Suharto has 
worsened because of economic inequities among the populace. During the ensuing riots 
and confrontation, grudges against the old regime were expressed by the targeting of 
government buildings.97  All of these chaotic circumstances at the national level definitely 
affected the balance of local political and socio-economic atmospheres within those 
fragile areas.   
Another issue that fueled ethnic tensions in Indonesia after 1998 was a shift in 
political direction by President Suharto toward Indonesian Moslems, which began in the 
early 1990s. For example, Bertrand notes that “Islamization” during the last phase of the 
New Order created ambiguity and anxiety among Christians about their future. The 
creation of ICMI, which granted a greater role to Moslems, led Indonesia to a critical 
juncture, as it marginalized Christians from their former positions. However, during the 
crisis of the New Order’s administration, national politics changed when Moslems started 
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distancing themselves from President Suharto and raised their voices against the 
government. They urged the New Order regime to end the existing corruption, to 
embrace democracy, and to stop making policies that benefited only minority groups 
instead of the majority of the people in Indonesia.98  The arguments about state policy 
toward Moslems that cause ethnic conflict often ignore the facts that, “though many 
regions are affected by these policies, only some of them produce ethnic conflict.”99 The 
ambiguity of the national politics following the collapse of the New Order regime 
intensified the friction between Moslems and Christians in particular areas, such as Poso 
and Maluku, where religious hegemony had been embedded in the society for years. 
Whenever religious issues entered into politics, conflicts were easily escalated between 
groups that previously had been religiously polarized. Jacques Bertrand’s argument, in 
Nationalist and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, cannot fully explain the phenomena of 
Indonesia’s ethnic conflicts, but he at least provides us with a religious dimension of the 
conflict that then can be used to explain some of the current ethnic issues.  
Poso Regency initially experienced ethnic conflict in December 1998, when 
bloody clashes erupted between indigenous and Bugis youth. Similar to the Maluku 
conflict, the violence in Poso quickly spread throughout the region, and the local army 
and police were unable to control it. The chaotic situation can be best explained by 
looking at both the national level, as mentioned above, and the local level as well. 
Underlying religious, socio-economic, and cultural differences, compounded by political 
competition between Moslems and Christians, eventually led to severe ethnic conflicts. 
However, religious issues were not an initial underlying factor. It was only after both 
groups of people politicized the religious issue in the conflict that people in Poso became 
polarized and began attacking one another. Indeed, Poso conflict was not a religious 
conflict, as an examination of the local socio-economic and political issues makes clear. 
For instance, over time, the economic disparities between indigenous and migrant groups, 
social issues such as alcoholism and political competition for prestigious local positions, 
such as Bupati (District Mayor) and Sekwilda (District secretary), between Moslems and 
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Christians created tension among the Poso populace. Cultural differences such as 
customary law and traditions within the diverse society also contributed.  Thus, I would 
argue that the conflict in Poso was not essentially religious. Instead, we should look at it 
as an ethnic conflict over socio-economic and political matters.  
In this chapter, the Poso ethnic conflict will be explained in more detail. First, I 
will describe the Poso conflict chronologically, from 1998 to 2004. Second, I will analyze 
the underlying factors within the society that made Poso more susceptible to ethnic 
conflict. Third, I will explore the Indonesian government’s response to the conflict. This 
section, therefore, will provide an overall picture of the conflict in Poso.  My purpose in 
examining these issues is to attempt to answer my main thesis questions: Why have 
ethnic conflicts occurred frequently in Indonesia since 1998? Were the conflicts due to 
differences among Indonesian people, differences of religion, culture, political insights, 
and economic gaps? What were some of the reasons for the Indonesian government’s 
inability to identify the early symptoms of potential conflict? And what are the 
constraints and barriers, for the government, in preventing further eruptions of conflict in 
the future? 
B. CONFLICT’S CHRONOLOGY 
The conflict in Poso, like the conflict in Maluku, followed President Suharto’s 
resignation in 1998. The conflict claimed the lives of around 1,000 to 2,500 people, both 
Moslems and Christians and nearly 100,000 fled their burning houses.100 The long-term 
conflict was intense and caused a lot of casualties during the course of confrontations and 
violence. The vast majority of weapons, most of which were eventually turned in, were 
“machetes, other blades and senjata rakitan” (homemade deadly weapons from small 
workshops).101  It was not only well-armed factions, but also the involvement of intruders, 
that caused mass destruction and the deaths of many people. No one imagined that a 
small dispute in the heart of Poso City in December 1998 would lead such a harmonious 
society to experience such widespread ethnic conflict.  
Most people believe that the many recent conflicts in Indonesia are part of its 
colonial legacy.  We do not deny that colonialism and its divide-and-conquer policies left 
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the people in Indonesia behind the rest of the developing world for decades. But how did 
this happen in Poso in particular? Historically, we look back to the Dutch efforts during 
the early 1900s to convert as many indigenous people in the mountainous interior as 
possible to Christianity. Their policy was mainly for the purpose of establishing a buffer 
population against an influential Moslem coastal kingdom that was perceived by the 
Dutch at the same time as their main threat. The Dutch provided most Christians with 
new settlements and taught them new agriculture technique how to work, from slash-and-
burn farming to a wet-rice farming system. Later, most of these people who lived around 
Poso Lake, called themselves Pamonans.102 The Dutch policy of homogenizing a 
population as a buffer against another group through religious conversion polarized the 
region and made it susceptible to potential ethnic conflict. Conflict, as we have seen, 
often surfaces when the central power cannot properly control a region, especially in 
terms of its politics and socio-economic factors. For instance, when Japan took control in 
1942, chaotic conditions erupted and resulted in conflict between Moslems and 
Christians. But, the conflict that occurred between Moslems and Christian in 1998 was 
also initially triggered by communal conflicts between the indigenous people and 
migrants in the city of Poso. 
To better understand the nature of the conflict in Poso and how this conflict 
endured for almost four years, I will describe the conflict chronologically from 1998 to 
2004. Not every incident is included; instead, the focus will be on some major events that 
were recorded by the media and NGOs. According to the data compiled by observers, the 
conflict can be divided into five phases.103  
1.  The First Phase: December 1998  
The first conflict in Poso did not spread widely over the region; instead, it was 
limited to several neighborhoods in Poso City. The conflict erupted, coincidentally, just 
after the district chief’s announcement on December 13, 1998, that he would not seek re-
election.104  That local political circumstance gave many ambitious candidates a chance 
to openly compete to become the new chief. In regard to the two prestigious positions, 
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that of district mayor and that of district secretary, there is an unwritten rule in Poso 
about how to combine the positions in terms of religion. If the district mayor is a 
Moslem, then the district secretary must be a Christian, and vice versa.105 Shortly after the 
current district mayor’s announcement, Poso was overwhelmed by an intense political 
campaign, which resulted in the raising of tensions between Moslems and Christians. 
Competition over the district mayor’s position was mainly due to the perception that 
whoever won either position would have more political power over the distribution of 
contracts, jobs, and scarce resources. 
Many versions exist accounting for the initial conflict on Christmas Eve in Poso. 
One version describes a young resident of the Protestant neighborhood of Lombogia, 
named Roy Runtu Bisalembah, who was accused of stabbing Ahmad Ridwan, a Moslem 
from the Kayamanya neighborhood. According to the Christians, after being stabbed, 
Ridwan fled into a mosque; the Moslems’ account says that an attack occurred against a 
Moslem who was asleep in the mosque’s courtyard.106 Another version describes in detail 
that the initial conflict erupted between a drunken youth from a Protestant neighborhood 
and Moslems on the night of Ramadhan.  
When Muslims were fasting during Ramadhan, a group of Christians were 
aggravating those doing tarawih (night prayer), by becoming drunk in the 
front yard of a mosque. The inebriated/drunk group was asked to leave by 
one of the mosque’s wardens. They accepted at first but they weren’t 
happy. The next day, when the mosque warden was wandering around 
Poso to wake the Muslims up for sahur (or breakfast), the Christian group 
stopped the person by offering him to eat pork meat for sahur. He was 
brutally attacked by the Christian group and then he ran away from them 
to the mosque. He finally collapsed in the mosque.107 
After the incident, both sides’ religious leaders agreed that the attack on the 
Moslem was caused by the attackers drinking alcohol, which be banned during 
Ramadhan. Meanwhile, the police were busy confiscating alcohol in Poso City, which 
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Moslems also did in their forays. At the same time, several Protestant youths secured 
many of the shops belonging to Chinese Christians.108 Inevitably, this was followed by 
liquor disputes between the Moslems and Christians in Poso City. 
Following the initial conflict, deadly fights broke out in Poso, such as the one on 
December 27, 1998, during which a group of Protestants led by Herman Parimo clashed 
with Moslems from Palu, Parigi, and Ampana. The local police were unable to prevent 
the fighting, though they claimed they had closed the road that prevented outsiders from 
entering Poso City.109  Eventually, this first phase of the conflict became calmed after the 
local police arrested and jailed the alleged instigators, Herman Parimo from a Christian 
faction and Akfar Patanga from the Moslem side. There were also efforts by local and 
religious leaders from both sides to reduce the conflict using religious and cultural 
approaches.  
Soon afterwards the election for district mayor was held in Poso City. Abdul 
Muin Pusadan, a Moslem, was elected as the new chief.110 During the first phase of the 
conflict, political competition, compounded by politicization of religious issues to attract 
more people into the conflict in small cities such as Poso, evolved into severe ethnic 
conflicts. Weak law enforcement by the local police exacerbated a small clash, which 
then escalated into community clashes in remote areas around Poso.  
2.   The Second Phase: April 16-May 3, 2000  
After almost a year of calm, Poso was not really quite as peaceful as it appeared. 
The hatred, mutual suspicion, trauma, and revenge triggered during the first phase of the 
conflict remained among the populace, who then were segregated along religious and 
socio-cultural lines. These societal circumstances, coupled with weak law enforcement, 
resulted in renewed conflicts, sparked by a minor clash between some indigenous people 
and some migrants, or between Moslems and Christians. Furthermore, the media’s 
coverage of stories focused on reader circulation areas, using their influence to send 
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propaganda to people in both factions.111 Similar to the previous conflict, this second 
phase was also triggered by local political issues involved in the election of the district 
secretary.  
While tensions in the communities were already high and competition among the 
candidates was at its peak, the striking news in the local newspaper Radar Sulteng, issued 
on April 15, raised tension further by publishing a comment by Chaelani Umar, a 
member of the provincial assembly from the Unity Party (Partai Persatuan).112 Umar 
reportedly called on  the newly installed district mayor, Abdul Muin Pusadan, to remind 
him and the local parliament to accommodate the wishes of the local people, who were 
predominantly Moslem. In short, he stated that the people wanted Ladjalani, a Moslem 
candidate to be chosen as the new district secretary.113  Some groups who supported a 
different candidate took the news account seriously, while others opined that the news 
was biased and should be ignored.  
The day following the news, a young Moslem claimed that he had been attacked 
by drunken Protestant youths. Similar to the first phase of the conflict, confrontation 
occured immediately, involving Christians from Lombogia village and Moslems from the 
Kayamanya and Sayo village. According to one reporter’s data, though Moslems and 
Christians had stood face to face equipped with various types of weapons, the fight, in 
reality, had not yet erupted on a wide scale. Realizing that they were not well-organized 
and were fewer in number than the Moslems, the Christians removed themselves from the 
battle and sought refuge in the villages, Tentena and Togotu, where Christians were in the 
majority. On the other hand, local and religious leaders asked the Moslems to have more 
patience and to withdraw. As a result, they were led back to their homes without any 
incident against the Christians.114 Shortly, the Moslems, removed themselves from the 
conflict zone and headed to their respective villages. 
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On their way home, however, they were shocked and angered by alleged police 
personnel from mobile brigade units, just arrived in Poso from Palu, who opened fire on 
the crowd. Initially, the unit had been assigned to back up the local police and maintain 
security in Poso because it was reported that the violence there was immense. However, 
as a result of the crowd-shooting, three Moslems died: Mohammad Yusni (23), Yanto 
(13), and Rozal Machmud, who died later due to his serious injuries.115  The conflict soon 
heightened between police and Moslems, and later led to the burning of several police 
bases. The violence then spread to both Moslems and Christians, in general, and resulted 
in around four hundred houses and one church being burned in Lombogia village. From 
then on, aid started arriving in Poso from several places for either Moslems or Christians. 
One of the local Moslem intellectuals who had worked for a peace organization in Poso 
stated that he knew without any doubt that the aid to the warring sides included 
weaponry.116 Hence, the use of those weapons by both sides was suspected of being one 
of the factors that triggered future violence.   
In addition to the  political tension during the district mayor’s election, the second 
conflict phase was also affected by the existence of a politicized judiciary and people’s 
dissatisfaction with law enforcement. These factors can be best explained by looking at 
the local demands expressed when the North Sulawesi governor, Paliudju, visited the 
conflict areas in Poso. While he was there, Paliudju met with a Moslem group led by 
Aliansa Tompo. During the meeting, the Moslems demanded a follow-up on several 
issues. First, they asked Ladjalani, the district secretarial candidate, to accept the position. 
Second, they asked that the case against Agfar Patanga, who had been jailed during the 
first conflict as a suspected provocateur, be dropped. Third, they asked the government to 
fire the local police chief and, immediately, send the mobile brigade unit back to Palu. 
Aside from the local people’s demands, the second phase of the conflict deeply 
segregated people in Poso, leading both sides to recognize themselves as the white army 
for Moslems and the red army for Christians. To maintain peace in Poso, the Regional 
Military Command in South Sulawesi eventually sent six hundred soldiers, and the 
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conflict gradually de-escalated.117 During the second phase of the conflict, similar to the 
first one, people in Poso still witnessed how political motives drove people into bloody 
ethnic conflicts by using religious issues as a tool. Neither Moslems nor Christians 
realized that, as a result of the conflict, they themselves would suffer, while a small group 
of people took advantage of the conflict.   
3. The Third Phase: Retaliation Begins, May 2000 
A Moslem attack on the Christian village of  Lombogia during the second phase 
of the conflict had caused great damage. A few weeks later, the Christians retaliated by 
raiding Moslem villages and killing many people, including women and children. The 
people who suffered the most were from South Sulawesi and Gorontalo, but others 
suffered as well.  It was believed that the attackers were the red army, who called 
themselves the “red bats” and the “black bats.” They consisted mostly of young 
Protestants who had been displaced during the first and second phases of the conflict and 
had fled to a red-group training camp in Kelei. Their main targets during the raid were 
Moslems considered to be responsible for previous conflicts.118 At this stage of the 
conflict, although the local government had anticipated a further attack from the 
Christians, neither local authorities nor local police could prevent clashes from breaking 
out. The Moslem death toll increased significantly, due to the involvement of more lethal 
weapons, such as “dum-dums” (homemade weapons) and arrows. 
Chronologically, the third phase of conflict can be described as follows. On May 
22, 2000 at 2:00 a.m., a group of the red army, masked and led by Fabianus Tibo, moved 
from Gebang Rejo village to Poso City. The reason the group entered the city was to 
secure a church thought to be under attack by Moslems. During his trip, Tibo killed one 
policeman, known as Komaruddin Ali119 and two other Moslems, Abdul Syukur (40) and 
Baba (60).120 Moslems in Poso who watched the incident formed a large group, which 
immediately went after Tibo and his group.  Knowing his group was being approached by 
Moslems, Tibo quickly ran into a church and hid there. The church was surrounded by 
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Moslems; however, police arrived just in time to prevent mass anarchy. The police asked 
Tibo and his group to surrender, but instead he and his group fled to the hills behind the 
church. Three ninja members led by Tibo were captured, while Tibo and the rest of the 
members escaped. Finding that they were not able to seize Tibo, the Moslems burned the 
church and many motels in their attempt to find other Christians who were allegedly 
behind the attack.121  The tension between Moslems and Christians again escalated in 
Poso, and both sides prepared for future attacks. Road blockades into Poso were set up 
and civilian search operations implemented, to prevent intruders from attacking.     
On May 28, 2000, the Moslem village of Sintuwu Lemba, also  known as Kilo 
Nine, was again attacked by the red army, involving Fabianus Tibo and his group and 
resulting in 191 deaths. Other sources cite the death toll as 39 and say that the bodies 
were later found in three mass graves.  Sintuwu Lemba is only nine kilometers from 
Poso; it is made up of successful Javanese cacao farmers who migrated there from South 
Sulawesi. Most of the women and children in the village were captured, and some women 
were sexually abused. Men who survived the attack fled to Pesantren Wali Songo, a 
Moslem school, where some of them were later killed with guns and machetes, whether 
they had surrendered or not. Kilo Nine was not the only target attacked: other Moslem 
villages, such as Tabalo and a village for migrants from Java and Lombok, also became 
targets. Most victims’ accounts of similar attacks describe burning, kidnapping, and 
killing, by people dressed like “ninjas,” who targeted a particular ethnicity. One survivor 
witnessed: 
We were told to gather at the village hall by about 100 men with masks or 
cloths over their faces. A truck came, and they had a list. They took away 
eight people from Lombok and four from Java. At 2:00 we were made to 
walk. We saw a truck with two people in the back: her brother (indicates a 
young woman) and another relative. He told my wife not to cry, we are 
just going to get some things in the next town. We never saw them again. 
We walked all the way to Mapane. We spent two nights there and then 
went by truck to Poso town. They never told us they would come after us. 
They just said it was Bugis and Gorontalo they wanted. If they had said 
that we had to leave, okay we would have. But they never said anything 
about people from Lombok and Java.122  
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The Christian attacks on Moslem villages during the third phase of the conflict 
came about mainly in response to their acts of revenge during the second phase, when 
Moslems attacked Christian villages. The spread of the bloody conflict in Poso finally 
attracted Jakarta’s attention and the need for government to become more seriously 
involved and to send more troops to Poso. 
4.  The Fourth Phase: Displacement and Destruction, July 2001-
December 2001 
To reduce the tension remaining from the third phase of the conflict, the Palu 
government eventually asked the central government for help. In response to the 
desperate call from Palu, the Regional Military Command immediately sent 1,500 more 
soldiers, ten tanks, and a combat unit. Additional brigade units from Java were also sent 
to Poso. Hence, both security forces launched security operations: the Sadar Maleo 
Operation, which consisted of a mobile brigade unit and Operation Cinta Damai by the 
Indonesian Army. Most security personnel attached to sensitive areas were tasked to 
confiscate weapons and install temporary barracks for displaced persons. The local 
governments also conducted reconciliation efforts, which involved all the governors of 
central, north and south Sulawesi. In August 2000, all governors signed a peace 
agreement that emphasized helping and encouraging the return of displaced persons.  The 
governors’ effort, based on a local saying, “Sintuwu Maroso” (Strong When United), 
received much support from President Abdurrahman Wahid, who later joined in the 
traditional ceremony in Poso.123 Nevertheless, all the government efforts to forge peace in 
Poso were reversed, and the conflict escalated even more than before. The outbreak of the 
fourth phase of the conflict signaled the government that it had failed many times to 
foster peace in Poso. The suspected involvement of security personnel and outsiders, 
coupled with people’s dissatisfaction with law enforcement exacerbated the violence in 
fourth phase of the conflict.  
Prior to this, in the first few months of 2001, the court had held a trial for the red 
army members who had allegedly attacked Moslems during the second conflict phase. 
Three suspects, Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus Soares Da Silva, and Don Marinus Riwu, 
who had been captured by the Indonesian Army, were charged with killing three 
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Moslems in Poso in 1999. Tibo was also charged with carrying out killings 1990, a factor 
that led people to assume that Tibo had been a hired thug. Although he was a Catholic, 
Tibo had been recruited by the Protestants to fight against Moslems because he was 
known as a good fighter. Conversely, his defense council pointed out that Tibo was 
merely a scapegoat: at fifty-five, he was too old to be a faction leader.  He was also an 
uneducated migrant from Flores. Tibo and his family claimed that, in the 1990 killings, 
Tibo was only trying to help Moslems in their fight against the Balinese attackers. As for 
the killing of three Moslems in 1999, he claimed that he just wanted to “protect the 
Catholic Church compound in Moengko the night of the ninja attack.”  During the trial, 
there were violent protests in front of the courthouse between police and Moslems mostly 
displaced persons from Poso. The protesters questioned the testimony going on inside the 
courthouse on Tibo’s case and demanded that the court effectively handle the sixteen 
ringleaders named by Tibo. On April 5, 2001, all three defendants were sentenced to 
death for their roles in murdering Moslems.124 Tibo’s trial was a law-enforcement effort 
to prosecute people who were involved in bloody conflict; it sought to punish the leaders 
of warring parties who conducted violence, including killing, looting, and house-burning. 
Unfortunately, the efforts to bring the instigators to trial raised the tension between 
Moslems and Christians to a dangerous level. Many people, especially from the Christian 
side, questioned why the justice system brought only Christians to court while no 
Moslem was prosecuted. 
Following the complicated trial and the reopening of the debate on the issues 
regarding the election of the district secretary in Poso, both Christians and Moslems 
blamed the government for failing to settle the conflict effectively. On June 28, 2001, an 
unidentified group of armed men attacked and burned a vehicle from South Sulawesi, 
near Watuawu, south of Poso, leaving six people missing. Two days later, Moslems from 
Ampana marched to Poso to prevent the Christians from demonstrating in front of the 
official government building. Subsequently, in Malei; a sub-district of Lage, Moslems 
clashed with Christians, leaving one Moslem dead, two injured, and thirty houses burned. 
After the massacre of thirteen Moslems at Buyung Katedo, Sayo, and Toyado on July 3, 
2001, the conflict intensified. Musa, the imam, or mosque leader, was reportedly burned 
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to death; the other victims, mostly women and children, were killed with machetes. On 
the same day, the red army also attacked displaced persons’ barracks and killed three 
policemen and one civilian. On July 5, 2001, hundreds of red army soldiers were reported 
by the police and army to have set fire to the barracks that had been built for Moslems. 
After a warning shot, the police and army tried to secure the barracks, killing six red 
army members.125  The course of the described above signaled that the conflict in Poso 
was not over. It had led to even greater destruction during the fourth phase. The ongoing 
confrontations continued for almost three years, raising questions from many Indonesian 
people as to why the government could not bring peace to Poso, despite its recent efforts. 
Later, that government failure would give way to hard-line religious groups attempting to 
justify their involvement the violence.  
Over a period of four years, the impact of this simmering conflict, and the 
government’s failure to stop it, encouraged Laskar Jihad, based hundreds of miles away 
on Java, to intervene in Poso. Its initial reasons for coming into Poso were to provide 
humanitarian assistance and to protect Moslems from Christian attacks. In July of 2001, 
Laskar Jihad was received warmly by Poso Moslems, who could no longer rely on local 
security forces for their security. In October of 2001, the police were about to continue 
Operation Sadar Maleo V. In effect, the initial conflict between Christians and Moslems 
then shifted to a conflict between some Christians and Moslems and the police, also 
involving Laskar Jihad.  That same month, a confrontation between police and Laskar 
Jihad, known as the Mapane Incident, broke out in Poso. According to the Laskar Jihad’s 
version, on October 18, Moslems from Tabalo were chased by Christian Batalemba from 
their cacao grove. The police did nothing to help. During the evening, the Moslems 
retaliated, burning a car carrying goods from Batalemba and chasing the driver and the 
police who guarded it.  On October 20, Laskar Jihad and Tabalo Moslems, coupled with 
“supplemental troops” (laskar bantuan), prepared to attack the Batalemba village. In the 
incident, while a mobile brigade unit tried to prevent the attack, one mobile brigade unit’s 
member known as Ardiansyah was killed by a Moslem. As a result, police and other 
security forces intensified their search operation for illegal weapons, halting Moslems 
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and Christians caught carrying weapons and intending to engage in the conflict.126 During 
the police sweep operation, Moslems and Christians often accused police of mistreating 
and harassing people. Local people in Poso also questioned the improper detention of 
citizens by the police for possession of weapons. 
Though not very involved in the conflict with police and security forces, in 
villages surrounding Poso, Laskar Jihad confrontation with Christians remained intense. 
After the Mapane Incident, a November incident brought Moslems and Christians back 
into a war. On November 11, 2001, fighting between Moslems and Christians at 
Jembatan II left several casualties, including a retired soldier.  The next day, the fight 
continued at the border of Tanah Runtu and Lembomawu villages, involving hundreds of 
people, which ended only after security forces and police arrived on the scene. After a 
few weeks of relative calm, on November 27 the conflict broke out again when Christians 
from Batalemba attacked and fired on Moslems in Tabolo village. According to Moslem 
sources, two people were killed, Muhammad Sanusi (33) and Yudi (15). The Christians 
claimed that one person, Kede (30), died in Batalemba. The attack, between Christians 
and Moslems in Poso’s surrounding villages continued until December 2001. In the 
course of the confrontation, eight villages in Poso Pesisir and Lage district were burned 
to the ground and as many as 11,000 persons were displaced and fled to the hills of Tapu. 
It was the largest scale conflict since the 2000 attacks during the third phase of conflict. 
The conflict also affected Balinese, who had previously not been targeted. Almost 1,400 
Baliness were forced to seek refuge in other districts.127   
The wave of bloody confrontation that had continued for almost three years 
claimed scores of lives, and many houses, as well as houses of worship, and caused 
hundreds of thousands to flee from their villages. These events, once again, drew the 
central government’s attention to Poso. Eventually, President Megawati’s government 
decided to send Mr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the coordinating minister for politics 
and security, and Mr. Yusuf Kalla, the coordinating minister for people’s welfare, to 
begin discussions with local religious leaders. Led by Mr. Yusuf Kalla, the first meeting, 
held in Makassar in November 2001, involved three Moslems leaders, Adnan Arsal, Haji 
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Hasanudin, and Abdul Wahid Lamidji, and two Christian leaders, Rev. J. Santo and Rev. 
Rinaldy Damanik.128 A second meeting, held December 19-20, 2001, resulted in an 
agreement to halt the conflict and to work together comprehensively to maintain peace in 
Poso. A ten point Malino Declaration was finally signed by both delegations: twenty-four 
Christians and twenty-five Moslems from their respective communities in Poso and Palu. 
The meeting was also attended by high-ranking officials from Sulawesi and as an 
observer, by Maj. Gen. Achmad Yahya, the chief of the Wirabuana Military 
Command.129 The ten points of the Malino Accord are as follows: 
1.  To cease all forms of conflicts and disputes 
2.  To obey efforts to enforce the law and support legal sanctions against 
lawbreakers 
3.  To ask the state apparatus to act firmly and justly to maintain security 
4.  In order to create a condition of peace, to reject the imposition of a state of 
emergency and any foreign party involvement 
5.  To dismiss slander and dishonesty against all parties and enforce an 
attitude of mutual respect, and to forgive for the sake of peaceful 
coexistence 
6.  Poso is an integral part of Indonesia. Therefore every citizen has the right 
to live, come and stay peacefully and respectfully of local customs 
7.  All rights and belongings have to be returned to their lawful owners as 
they were before the conflict began 
8.  To return all displaced people to their respective place 
9.  Together with the government, to carry out complete rehabilitation of the 
economic infrastructure 
10.  To carry out respective religious law according to the principle of mutual 
respect and to abide by all the agreed upon rules, in the form of laws, 
government regulations, or other regulation.130 
In addition to the Malino Accord, both factions agreed to establish two joint 
commissions, one that would deal with law and one that would deal with social and 
economic conditions. Although the Accord did not end the hostilities at every level, it 
nonetheless made a significant contribution to the rebuilding of mutual trust and peaceful 
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coexistence in Poso. However, weaknesses of the Malino Accord, especially with regard 
to the implementation of all points of the agreement, gradually came into question. These 
will be illustrated in my discussion of the fifth of the conflict.  
5.  The Fifth Phase: After Malino 
Societal tensions after the Malino Accord were less than they had been in Poso. 
Although the peace agreement could not fully guarantee personal security for everyone, it 
at least reduced the tension between Moslems and Christians. And it gave people on both 
sides a chance to end the conflict and return to their normal lives. However, that was not 
an easy thing to do in Poso. Local people frequently spoke of  Poso’s fragile peace, 
describing Poso an unsafe, but secure place, meaning that attack from others could still 
happen at any time even during a time of peace. Most people sent relatives home to clean 
up and build temporary housing, but they had no intention of leaving their carefully built 
shelters.131  People were still traumatized and worried about the implementation of the 
Malino Accord in their daily lives. Though people supported the peace agreement, they 
watched its implementation carefully due to their general mistrust of the government.  
Even after quite a while, the Malino Accord continued to be threatened with 
failure in Poso. Permanent peace was still far from people’s hopes. A hundred and 
twenty-nine violations of the Malino Accord have been recorded from the time the 
agreement was signed in December 2001 until 2004.132 But, “the violence after the 
Malino Accord differed from what had preceded it. There were very few clashes between 
communities. Most attacks were reported as ‘mysterious shootings,’ and ‘bomb 
explosions,’ and officials frequently blamed them on ‘outside elements’ that wanted to 
sabotage the peace process.”133 The weaknesses of the Malino Accord can be looked at 
from different perspectives. One claim that, “the declaration is elitist, relies on a 
quantitative measure of success, and is laden with opportunities for profitable ‘projects.’” 
Another find that, “the Accord also separates social rehabilitation, reconstruction of 
facilities, and security, as if these three concerns were not related.” Due to a lack of 
adequate information between the different levels of people, all both sides were easily 
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influenced by divisive statements in the media.134 Even though these factors of 
impending peace in Poso were recognized by the government, peace could not be 
sustained effectively. The government put a lot of effort into rebuilding mutual trust 
among the people by launching law enforcement programs, but people in Poso were still 
disappointed. Very few perpetrators were captured or punished. The manifestations of 
that disappointment are the conflicts that surfaced after the Malino Accord. 
At this point, some identification of the involvement perpetrators and their 
motives is in order. It will give us a clearer picture of how the conflict evolved and how it 
was conducted, from the first phase of the conflict onward. One group of perpetrators was 
essentially an ideological group, “consisting of Moslem and Christian fanatics who 
continue to stoke rivalry based on misplaced religious loyalty.” A second group is more 
or less a “floating mass” of individuals trying to encourage chaos for personal benefit. 
Lastly is a group known as the “victim group” those “who harbor deep hatred and take 
revenge for the death of their loved ones.”135  The fact that these groups had been 
involved from the conflict’s beginning and the ineffectiveness of the government’s 
efforts to peacefully settle and end the conflict in Poso compounded the ongoing 
problems. Because so many possibilities and motives were involved in the violence, it 
was hard for the security forces to identify and capture the perpetrators. However, there is 
no doubt that the existence of professional, unbiased security forces might prove more 
successful. 
By a significant effort, the security forces intensified their door-to-door search 
operations, shifting the form of the conflict after the Malino Accord from communal 
clashes into sporadic and mysterious shootings and bombings. Equally important, an 
internal local security system, known as neighborhood watch groups (sistem keamanan 
lingkungan) was also installed by the security forces. Although the deployment security 
force supported by the local people was increased, violence after the Malino Accord still 
prevailed. Incidents include the bombing of four protestant churches in Palu on 
December 31, 2001, less than two weeks after the Malino Accord was signed.136  During 
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July 2002, five mysterious shooting incidents were reported in which five civilians from 
Poso pesisir, South Pamona subdistrict, and Lage district were killed.137 On December 5, 
a bomb explosion hit an automobile dealership owned by Mr. Yusuf Kalla and another hit 
the McDonald’s restaurant at a mall in Makasar.138  In addition to the sporadic violence, 
on October 12, 2002, a tremendous bomb explosion hit Bali, Indonesia, causing Laskar 
Jihad to publicly announce its departure from Palu.139 That announcement was received 
happily by the people in Poso, especially the Christian community, which allegedly 
considered the Laskar Jihad as the main actors in the current conflict. Overall, the course 
of violent conflict in Poso caused both sides, Moslem and Christian tremendous 
suffering. An important lesson can be learned from the conflict in Poso: politicizing 
religious issues so as to involve a maximum amount of people in the conflict for a single 
group’s of political benefit is, potentially, a very volatile situation. It needs to be 
identified and evaluated as early as possible by the government. By doing so, possible 
future conflicts can be prevented or avoided. 
C.  THE UNDERLYING FACTORS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 
The conflict in Poso had underlying factors similar to those in Molluca. As noted 
earlier (see the Molluca conflict section), it is the underlying social factors that define the 
essential nature of a dispute among people before it actually manifests itself in violent 
actions. In both Poso and Molucca, it is important to remember, the various groups 
among their populaces had lived in close relationships for decades before the conflict 
broke out. It was a conjuncture of major events in Indonesia—the collapse of Suharto’s 
presidency, the severe economic crisis in 1997, the premature adoption of democracy and 
reform, and the abrupt implementation of regional autonomy—that sharpened the 
differences among the people in the multiethnic regions of Molluca and Poso.140 These 
significant transitional events aggravated the differences within the society and set off 
ethnic conflict in both regions. Given the commonality of the Molluca and Poso conficts, 
the next section will focus on Molluca’s similar underlying factors. They include political 
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disputes, economic and social disparities, religious differences, cultural differences, and 
tribal disputes. To begin, I will briefly really and describe the political disputes in Poso, 
to provide the necessary background. 
1.  Political Disputes 
There is a common idea that a prior political dispute led to the wide-spread ethnic 
conflict in Poso. An informal arrangement of “power sharing” between Moslems and 
Christians was ruined by the new political order installed during the period of the 
transitional governments of Presidents Habibie, Gus Dur, and Megawati. People in Poso 
hoped to share the overall power through several strategic positions in the district 
governments, especially where the district head (bupati) and the district secretary 
(sekretaris wilayah daerah or sekda) were concerned. “A Moslem bupati was expected to 
have a Protestant sekwilda, and vice versa.”141 That informal arrangement had existed for 
decades. What made Poso relatively peaceful in terms of political power-sharing then is 
exactly the same condition referred to by Ulrich Schneckener in “Model of Ethnic 
Conflict Regulation.” 
The key idea of any power-sharing structure is that two or more ethnic 
groups have to rule the common polity jointly and take decisions by 
consensus. No single group can decide important matters without the 
consent of the other(s). On the basis of informal or formal rules all groups 
have access to political power and other resources.142 
Unfortunately, by the time Poso’s autonomous regulations were initially imposed 
after the collapse of President Suharto’s regime, the political dispute had already begun 
and was being fueled by the ethnic conflict in Poso. The following data from Moslem 
academics on the religious affiliation of officeholders between 1989 and 1999 helps to 
explain the shift in the political balance of power in Poso.  
At the time, more Moslems than Christian occupied many strategic positions 
within the district government, for example, positions in the office of head district, 
agencies (dinas), divisions (bagian), and subdistricts (kecamatan). In addition, the 
percentage of Christian officeholders decreased from 54 percent to 39 percent, while the 
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percentage of Moslems rose accordingly. The Human Rights Watch agency in Indonesia 
concluded that “the chronology of the conflict suggests a connection between the 
question of power sharing and outbreaks of violence.” The first phase of the conflict 
broke out just after the district head announced on December 13, 1998, that he would not 
seek re-election. One explanation for the second phase of the conflict, which coincided 
with the district secretary’s election in April 2000, is that a preferred candidate was not 
chosen. Similarly, the fourth phase of conflict occurred in July 2001, also coinciding with 
a district secretary election.143  In Poso, the change in the balance of political power and 
the abolishment of informal mechanisms of power-sharing sharpened the differences 
among people and subsequently polarized   Moslems and Christians. The course of the 
conflict and its connection to political disputes about strategic positions in the district 
government reinforce my argument that politics was a substantial factor in triggering 
conflict in Poso. 
Religious factors were also undeniable elements in the triggering of Poso’s ethnic 
conflict. Indeed, religious goals “were secondary to political ones.” A report by Moslem 
academics, who compiled the data, and a statement by a Moslem religious leader also 
support this argument. According to the report, “67 percent of those surveyed attributed 
the conflict to politics, primarily competition for positions. Only 6 percent described the 
cause as religious.” Furthermore, a Moslem religious leader who was involved in various 
early conflicts in Poso agreed: “Politics. Then religion was dragged in, brought 
inadvertently. Politicians from both sides tried to gain support through religion.”144 The 
Norwegian Refugee Council and the Far Eastern Economic Review also found that 
political disputes outweigh other combined factors that contributed to the ethnic conflict 
in Poso: “Political and religious leaders in the area agree that a combination of forces 
were at work in creating the unrest, and that local political elites used the communal strife 
as a means of galvanizing support drawn on religious lines.”145  Therefore, the role of the 
local political elites and their actions were apparently a direct result of changes in Poso’s 
political arena. This can be best explained by looking at the emotion-based theory 
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proposed by Petersen. “When individuals come to believe that the new situation has 
produced some type of discrepancy among groups, or has produced a perceived threat 
from another group, an emotion results that generates a change in the saliency of 
particular desire.”146 Thus political elites who perceived a threat from other groups used 
religion as their vehicle to gain support from the masses, a strategy that eventually 
resulted in conflict. The political-dispute perspective gives us a clearer understanding of 
how conflict in Poso both evolved and was prolonged. Similar to Molluca, conflict in 
Poso cannot be separated from its political disputes, though national political disputes 
affected the region less than in Molluca. 
2.  Economic and Social Disparities 
Since political struggle has its own implications for economic and social status in 
Poso, political power is deemed as an essential part of people’s lives, especially by local 
politicians. Political power is interpreted in this context as a means to gain control over 
the distribution of government contracts, aid, and jobs. Moreover, people from both sides 
use their political power to compete with each other in order to secure land and access to 
markets for their goods. Nonetheless, there had been a good trading relationship for many 
years between Moslems who lived in the coastline areas and the Christians who lived in 
upland areas. But that mutual relationship gradually faded away after people within both 
areas were overwhelmed by economic problems that were, in turn, exacerbated by the 
severe economic crisis of 1997 and the influx of migrants. Subsequently, the good 
working relationship between Moslems and Christians turned into harsh competition over 
scarce resources. By the time it occurred, the conflict of interests over economic matters 
had spread not only to urban areas but also into rural areas where ethnic Javanese and 
Bugese usually engaged in competition with ethnic Pamona (indigenous people) over 
land for cash crops.147 All these economic tensions between indigenous people and 
migrants caused one or another group of people to attack each other. This fragile societal 
condition proved ideal for ethnic conflicts to take place. As we have seen, even a small 
clash can do it.  
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To explain the economic and social disparities that triggered the ethnic conflict in 
Poso, I use the security-dilemma theory proposed by Beverly Crawford. She points out 
that the conflict might break out when a group of people wants “to grasp the resources 
that assure their security before these resources are seized by an opposing group.” In the 
case of Poso, when the central government lost its absolute power to control the region, 
causing a situation “[w]here anarchy prevails, people tend to seek security above all other 
goals. Their quest for security leads them to take measures that render other groups 
insecure, and those groups, in turn, take measures that threaten others.”148 This is exactly 
what was happening in Poso prior to the first and second phases of the conflict, in 1998 
and 1999, respectively. The failure of authority to address the problem impartially during 
those periods thus intensified the security dilemma between Moslems and Christians. 
Eventually, a third phase of the conflict broke out in mid 2000, after Christians took 
revenge against the Moslems, who had allegedly been involved in the previous conflict. 
By that time, however, hundreds of people had been killed. The Christians justified the 
matter of injustice, reflecting social tension against Moslems during the third phase of the 
conflict, due to economic disputes between indigenous people and migrants such as 
controlling access to land for cash crops and competing for strategic positions in district 
governments to control contracts, aid and jobs.  
3.  Religious Differences 
The conflict in Poso was initially sparked on Christmas Eve in 1998, by a fight 
between a drunken youth from a Christian village and a Moslem youth, which polarized 
people in Poso into a dual religious alignment. For years before, people’s lives had 
already been segregated, as in general, migrants and indigenous people lived in separate 
areas. Most Moslems lived in the coastal areas, while Christians lived in the upland areas. 
When the initial conflict broke out, coinciding with the local political campaign for a 
district head in 1998, religious affiliations became more important than civil 
responsibility to people’s sense of identity. Moreover, after the third phase of the conflict 
in April 2000, religion played a more prominent role than ever before. Many groups 
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referred to themselves by their religion such as the “red army” for Christians and the 
“laskar jihad” for Moslems. These circumstances lead us to conclude that the conflicts in 
Poso cannot be separated from religious issues and that, in many ways, religion has 
profoundly polarized the Poso populace.  Once conflict erupted, the Moslems and 
Christians had very different ways of viewing it. On the one hand, Moslems argued that 
“reports of forced conversion, destruction of houses of worship, and attacks on local 
Moslems as well as migrants demonstrated the religious nature of the conflict.” On the 
other hand, “Christians, especially solidarity groups abroad, depicted the conflict as an 
Islamic ‘holy war’ against the Protestants.”149 These contrasting points of view toward the 
conflict exacerbated and polarized the society and   eventually undermined the 
government’s efforts to end the conflicts peacefully.  
In retrospect, religious tensions have historically been embedded within Poso 
society. Up to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Islam had not yet spread widely in 
Eastern Indonesia, including Central Sulawesi. Nonetheless, competition between Islam 
and the Christianity brought by the Portuguese and Spanish was intense, in terms of 
converting an animistic indigenous people to either Islam or Christianity. And later, 
during the following century, the Dutch introduced of Protestantism as yet another new 
form of worship,150 and another potential source of religious tension in Central Sulawesi. 
Since then, religious tensions have gradually increased, since migrants and voluntary 
migrants, through transmigration sponsored by the Indonesian government, brought more 
people, mostly Moslems, into Central Sulawesi. In regard to the role of religion in the 
Poso conflict, Bertrand argues: “The differentiation along the religious and ethnic 
identities was important in the expression of conflict. While economic motivations may 
have underlain some tensions, they tended to be stronger if combined with differences in 
religion.”151  Another way to explain how religious tension fueled the conflict in Poso is 
discussed by Elwin Tobing in terms of “the perception about other religions.”  
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Perhaps there is an unconscious distrust, a hidden enmity, toward the other 
religion deeply seated in the development of each religion itself. The latent 
mutual distrust among religious followers has enabled factors such as 
political, economic and social tensions including external forces to create 
such a horrible and uncontrollable violence. In Poso…[h]ere we are 
particularly being confronted with the ever haunting phenomenon of 
Islamization versus Christianization. There is a latent suspicion covertly 
cherished by each religious community toward one another, particularly 
among Moslems and Christians, of the problem of “Islamization” and 
“Christianization.”152 
Even though many people believe that conflict in Poso was not religious, religious 
roles did indeed fuel the conflict and thus cannot be ignored.   
4.  Cultural Differences 
As in the conflict in Molluca, in the case of Poso, the extent to which the cultural 
differences between indigenous people and migrants contributed to the conflict is less 
important than other factors such as the accompanying political and economic and social 
disputes. As Human Development Report has concluded “Cultural differences are not the 
primary cause of the conflict.”153 However, in contrast, as Horowitz points out, ethnic 
conflicts are often labeled cultural conflicts because it is generally cultural differences 
that divide ethnic groups, especially when we turn to the political arena. He further 
emphasizes that there are conceptions of the role of cultural differences in the politics of 
ethnic relations, which make a society have many cultural sections and one of them 
dominates the others.154 As has been pointed out, although the tension between 
indigenous people and migrants in Poso may come first from political, economic, and 
religious factors, cultural differences may provoke further conflict.  
Similar to the conflict in Molluca, the ethnic conflicts in Poso were also fueled by 
the customary differences between the indigenous people and the migrants over alcohol 
consumption that leads to violence. An example of that cultural difference is the incident 
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that occurred in Poso when a drunken youth from a Christian village attacked a young 
Moslem during Ramadhan. Subsequently, both Moslem and Christian religious leaders 
agreed to ban alcohol consumption during Ramadhan to show respect to Moslems, who 
were fasting. Confrontations were ongoing because the Moslems tried to diminish alcohol 
circulation by directly attacking liquor shops. And Christians tried to protect the liquor 
shops, most of which belonged to Chinese Christians. In any circumstance, a lack of 
mutual respect and ignorance of cultural differences can be a breeding ground for ethnic 
conflict, as happened in both Poso and Maluku.  
5.  Tribal Disputes 
Interethnic relations in Poso have not yet been seriously studied. For instance, 
there are very few articles that explain clearly how “mainly ‘native’ highland Pamona, 
Mori, and Lore along with Minahasa and Toraja migrants versus mainly coastal migrant 
Bugese, Gorontalo, Kaili, and Arabs along with ‘native’ Tojo residents”155 got involved 
in the conflict. Looking back at the first phase of the conflict in Poso in 1998, we can see 
that the initial dispute took place between two youths from different ethnic and religious 
affiliations. All of a sudden, a series of small conflicts led to a large-scale ethnic conflict. 
This form of conflict is explained by Bertrand as a riot form that escalates to the phase of 
violence.  
Riots are one of the most common forms, in which groups react to an 
event that provokes violence when tensions are running high. A first 
incident can become a repeated series of riots in a chain of violent events 
that are increasingly independent from the original sources of tension 
between groups. Violence becomes the product of cycles of anger and 
revenge, of reinterpretation of group relations, and of a new discourse 
about violent events that sets the stage for future conflict.156 
What Bertrand describes is how the ethnic conflict in Poso exactly evolved, as an 
initial tribal dispute between migrants and indigenous people contributed to a large-scale 
ethnic conflict. The latent intertribal disputes in Poso over politics, economics, and 
religion surfaced as a form of anger and hatred once one group of people felt threatened 
by another.  
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In explaining ethnic conflict in Poso and anywhere else where tribal disputes 
ostensibly fueled a larger scale of violence, many policy makers and journalists point out 
that the cause is “simple and straightforward.”  Brown, in his essay “Ethnic and Internal 
Conflict: Causes and Implication,” says that the “ancient hatred” that each ethnic and 
religious group of people belongs to is a driving force behind all these violent 
conflicts.157 But how do tribal disputes based on ancient hatred constitute a larger scale of 
violence? Peter Ulvin in his article “Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda,” 
explains how one ethnic group of people prepares for mass violence: three phases aim to 
overcome the moral inhibitions against violence. First, there is “authorization, which 
absolves the individual of the responsibility to make moral choices”; second is 
“routinization, when the action becomes so organized that there is no opportunity for 
raising moral questions”; and last is “dehumanization, when the actors’ attitude toward 
the target and toward themselves become so structured that it is neither necessary nor 
possible for them to view the relationship in moral terms.”158 All the theories offered here 
contribute to an overall explanation of how the tribal disputes among the populace in 
Poso eventually led to ethnic conflicts. Once even a small clash erupted, each group, 
migrants and indigenous people, sensing a lack of justice, prepares for mass violence. 
The bias and asymmetry of information from media also hastened the advent of the three 
phases of mass violence in Poso. In short, tribal disputes in Poso contributed to a large -
scale ethnic conflict that began in 1998. 
D.  THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSES 
Indonesia has experience many ethnic conflicts since 1997, during a time when 
the national economy and politics were very weak. This phenomenon attracted 
government attention to particular regions—Molluca, Poso, Kalimantan, Sumatera and 
Java—where ethnic conflicts and riots sporadically took place. Some of them were 
successfully resolved; others were ongoing at the time this thesis was being written 
(2005). In the case of Poso, and most likely the conflict in Molluca, it took several years 
for the government to end the conflict that quickly spread throughout those two regions. 
In 2002, an International Commission for Religious Freedom report accused the 
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Indonesian government of neglecting the conflict in Poso, when it was still contained in 
one area, and making almost no effort to stop the violence. Moreover, the commission 
further pointed out that a statement made by President Abdurrahman Wahid about the 
way the conflict should be ended by the people of Poso was a sign of the government’s 
frivolity. Wahid stated that the people of Poso should halt the conflict through their own 
efforts; the government should only acts as a facilitator.159 The weakness of the 
transitional government under President Abdurrahman Wahid is reflected in the way he 
dealt with the initial conflict in Poso. Nonetheless, President Wahid was not totally to 
blame. Many other aspects have to be looked at in order to determine the government’s 
failure. They include, for example, the legacy from the previous administrator, the 
national political and economic chaos, as well as the lack of ability of the local 
governments and security forces. Moreover, Poso was a remote area with no airfield or 
media at the time the initial conflict took place. However, the security of the Indonesian 
people is the government’s responsibility.   
Prior to the Malino Accord in 2001, as explained earlier, the provincial and 
district governments implemented a series of ineffective reconciliation efforts to deal 
with the conflict in Poso. From the first to the third phase of the conflict, the central 
government addressed the conflict by calling local leaders to sit down together and write 
a peace agreement. That is a standard tactic in such situation. The Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso 
(Sintuwu Maroso reconciliation) was one such example pursued by the government. 
During the process of reconciliation, after the August 2000 agreement, a team of 
traditional leaders formed, established dialogues, and visited the sites of prior conflicts. 
Due to its limited focus on only traditional leaders, however, and given the deep-seated 
mistrust among the leaders, the agreement was not effective enough to halt the conflict. 
The government was criticized for failing to bring the “local community, religious and 
traditional leaders into a meaningful way” to engage in the peace-agreement process.160 
The results of the government’s efforts during the initial conflict were obscured by the 
way the government identified the source of the problem and involved the people of 
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Poso. The ensuing lack of success in the government attempt to find solutions for both 
warring parties allowed the conflict to be sustained in Poso.  
The next effort by the government, during the fourth phase of the conflict in 2001, 
was to send a reconciliation team consisting of provincial figures from Palu, under Vice-
Governor Rully Lamadjijo, to settle the conflict. Again, the team failed and was 
“criticized as ineffective, top-down, and a waste of time and money by provincial 
assembly members and others.” The team failed because those engaged in the peace –
agreement process did not represent the general populace of Poso. In the following 
months, another joint team of provincial officials, led by Colonel Gumyadi, was posted in 
Poso. The main tasks of the team were to determine the root causes of the conflict and to 
collect data on property left behind by displaced persons. During the middle of October 
2001, the team leader abandoned the mission because he was dissatisfied with the failure 
of security forces to disarm the warring parties. Another member of the team revealed 
that it had failed because the team was “underfunded, bombed in Mapane, thrown out of 
Poso, and yelled at in Tentena.”161  Despite the government’s failed efforts prior to the 
Malino Accord, it had tried to halt and end the conflict peacefully by sending troops and 
police to settle the conflict through cultural and religious approaches and a declaration of 
martial law in Poso. In short, the government’s efforts only came to light after Mr. Yusuf 
Kalla and Mr. Bambang Yudhoyono were sent to Poso to comprehensively end the 
conflict. This resulted in the signing of the Malino Accord by both warring parties—
Moslems and Christians—in December 2001, even though sporadic violence still 
continued.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
Major events in Indonesia—the collapse of President Suharto’s presidency, the 
severe economic crisis in 1997, the premature adoption of democracy and reform, and the 
abrupt implementation of regional autonomy—sharpened the differences among the 
population of multiethnic regions all over Indonesia. Those national events are in part to 
blame for the ethnic conflicts in particular areas, including Poso. Moreover, in the case of 
Poso, underlying factors such as political disputes, social and economic disparities, 
religious and cultural differences also contributed to the ethnic conflicts. The 
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combination of national and local factors eventually led to the severe ethnic conflicts in 
Poso on Christmas Eve, 1998, which the local security forces were unable to stop. As a 
result, this conflict was ongoing for almost four years, resulting in the deaths of from 
1,000 to 2,500 people.   
Among the factors that I have mentioned so far, the local political disputes over 
the district mayor and district secretary elections outweighed other factors and 
established a breeding ground for ethnic conflict in Poso. The changing balance of power 
in local politics, leading to shifts in the way Moslems and Christians shared their political 
and religious power, was the main reason for Poso’s ethnic conflicts. Unquestionably, I 
find that the course of the conflict and its connection to political disputes over strategic 
positions in district governments was a substantial factor in triggering the conflict. At the 
same time, other factors such as social/economic disparities, and religious and cultural 
differences were used by politicians as vehicles to bring more people into the conflict.  
After the conflict erupted in Poso, a lack of justice and security guarantees from 
the government created mutual distrust between the peoples of Poso and government 
officials. That mutual distrust has hindered every government effort to seek peace in 
Poso, especially before the Malino Accord was signed at the end of 2001. In effect, the 
people, both Moslems and Christians, must live segregated by religious lines, which 
polarizes both groups. Conflict in Poso, then, was known and appeared as a religious 
conflict, rather than a purely ethnic conflict between the indigenous people and migrants 
over politics and the economy. Nevertheless, the conflict in Poso is not basically religious 
conflict, describing it as religious is definitely misleading. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDED MEASURES 
A. CONCLUSION 
After 1997, Indonesia experienced for the first time several severe ethnic 
conflicts. Since then, severe conflicts have occurred between various groups based on 
their ethnicity, religion, or social position in such places as Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, 
Maluku, and even in Jakarta when anti-Chinese riots took place in 1998, destroying large 
parts of Indonesia’s capital city.  These ethnic conflicts erupted partly because of the 
collapse of President Suharto’s regime, the severe economic crisis, which had started in 
1997, and the Indonesian government’s sudden movement to embrace democracy during 
the transitional period. Subsequently these events produced deep shock and uncertainty 
within people’s lives, and led to chaos everywhere. 
In addition to several political and economic crises from 1997 onward, several 
other underlying factors have exacerbated the problems. I realized these factors when 
examining two case studies of ethnic conflict: in Poso and Maluku. One underlying factor 
is political disputes among local politicians in their effort to gain strategic political seats 
such as district chief and district secretary. In effect, political competition based on 
ethnicity and religion had increased the tension among political supporters, particularly 
during the campaign, and eventually polarized people according to their ethnicity and 
religion. Another underlying factor is economic and social disparities among the 
populace, especially since the economic crisis in 1997. The unemployment rate has 
increased the severity of the economic crisis, especially among the youth. As a result, 
social tension has become more intense and people are more easily provoked by sensitive 
issues such as politics and religion to resort to violence in settling disputes. A third 
underlying factor that has contributed to conflicts is religious differences, which is an 
issue that has been used by elites and conflict entrepreneurs to mobilize people to support 
political agendas. Empirically, in the ethnic conflicts in Indonesia, religion has been a 
very effective issue, used to bring more people to engage in ethnic conflicts by spreading 
propaganda on both sides. The fourth underlying factor is cultural differences such as 
tradition (adat) and daily customs. These, too, were used to spark conflicts between two 
or more different ethnic groups. Based on the lessons learned from Poso and Maluku, 
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ethnic conflicts may occur because traditional institutions such as sintiwu maroso in Poso 
and pela gandong in Maluku were weakened during Indonesia’s transitional period when 
abrupt changes occurred in many state regulations such as otonomi daerah 
(decentralization). As a result, these institutions are no longer as effective as they used to 
be in settling disputes among people.  
Finally, the two case studies of ethnic conflict, in Maluku Island and Poso in 
central Sulawesi have revealed some valuable lessons about ethnic conflict in Indonesia. 
First, the larger ethnic conflicts stemmed from small individual clashes involving 
economic issues or alcohol abuse, and no one could have predicted that these conflicts 
would escalate. Second, once the conflict erupted, it got out of control and quickly spread 
into other areas. Third, the outcomes of the conflicts were devastating because the 
damage both material and to people’s lives left many people isolated because of their 
ethnicity and religion. Fourth, the escalation of conflicts into larger-scale ethnic conflicts 
was partly because local courts and police and security forces failed to properly address 
the initial disputes according to existing laws. Fifth, the prolonged conflict was hard to 
control because of the existence of cyclical revenge within and between warring parties 
and the involvement of third parties and conflict entrepreneurs, which continued to 
undermine the government’s reconciliation efforts.    
B. RECOMMENDED MEASURES 
Based on my case studies of ethnic conflict in Maluku and Poso, I would like  to 
recommend some measures for preventing future ethnic conflicts in Indonesia. There are 
three major divisions within the Indonesian government and one significant element 
within Indonesian society that have to work closely together in order to complement each 
other when dealing with potential ethnic-conflict areas. These four major elements are the 
local governments, the local Indonesian police and armed forces, local courts, and local 
religious and community leaders. All these elements can play a huge role in preventing 
initial conflicts triggered by local and national crises from escalating into large-scale 
ethnic conflicts. 
An equally important issue in dealing with future ethnic conflicts is how the 
central government delegates the command and control in the prevention of conflicts to 
the local governments and, at the same time, increases their capabilities for dealing with 
79
the underlying factors within their territories that could potentially trigger political, 
economic, social, religious, and cultural conflicts, or local tribal disputes. Following are 
some recommended measures that would be helpful in preventing future ethnic conflicts 
in Indonesia. I have drawn these measures from the lessons learned from the two case 
studies, ethnic conflict on Maluku Island and in Poso, Central Sulawesi. 
1. Recommended Measures for the Indonesian Government 
In general, the central government needs to encourage and increase the 
capabilities of local governments for dealing with future ethnic conflicts within their 
territories. To do so, the central government needs to delegate its command and control to 
local governments and to watch for the existence of potential ethnic conflict carefully due 
to its domestic policies in local areas. 
2. Recommended Measures for Local Governments 
All Indonesian regional governments, at least at the provincial and district levels, 
need to gather and maintain up-to-date information within their territories that covers 
politics, social-economic conditions, religion, culture, education, and demography 
statistics  that can be accessed by the public and all government agencies when 
formulating national or regional policies. This, in the long run, will reduce the possibility 
of conditions arising that might cause conflict among local people and, at the same time, 
it will effectively boost local development. 
The local governors and district heads should be the highest local authority, so 
that they are able to closely coordinate with local police and armed forces in formulating 
the best security strategies to prevent future ethnics conflicts, before implementing local 
security policies such as requiring everyone to have just one ID or setting up checkpoints 
for regular or random traffic checks.  
Local governments need to support local police and armed forces and equip them 
with, at least, a minimum number of support facilities in order to help them to conduct 
their security tasks, acquiring communication tools and patrol vehicle, and accessing 
local government information for security purposes. 
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Local governments have to make sure that if there is a conflict within their 
territories; they will not become part of the conflict but, instead, will be part of the 
solution to the conflict. 
Local governments need to encourage local religious and community leaders to 
regain their former roles in settling local conflicts rather than taking them to local courts. 
This method had proved effective in the past in settling many local conflicts throughout 
Indonesia, such as dealing with traditional water distribution and land allotment. 
Local governments also need to help rebuild communities that were damaged 
because of conflict such as in Maluku, Poso, and Kalimantan. 
3.  Recommended Measures for Local Police and Armed Forces 
Local police and armed forces personnel need to have knowledge of the ethnic 
conflicts in Indonesia. They need to know how the conflicts erupted and eventually 
escalated into larger conflicts. In order to do so, local police and armed forces should 
establish cooperation with local universities and their scholars who have been researching 
ethnic conflicts in Indonesia for quite some time. 
Local police and armed forces need to increase their intelligence personnel 
capabilities for dealing with ethnic conflict issues. By doing so, local police and armed 
forces can function better as a proper “early warning and early detection” system within 
their local community in dealing with the issues of local ethnic conflict.   
Local police and armed forces need to also function as a “deterrence force” to 
prevent local people or outsiders from creating conflict within their respective territories. 
This can be accomplished by joint patrols and regular joint exercises involving local 
governmental agencies.  
If there is a conflict that could potentially trigger a large-scale ethnic conflict, 
local police and armed forces have to be well coordinated so that they can prevent the 
spread of conflict and can make sure all personnel follow the existing procedures without 
initially resorting to coercion. 
Given their important roles as local security forces, local police and armed forces 
have to be well equipped and well trained in dealing with potential ethnic-conflict issues. 
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Equally important, they have to maintain their neutrality while performing their jobs and 
become problem solvers, rather than part of the problem itself. This is a very important 
measure because it will enhance the local people’s confidence in local security forces and 
will not become anarchic when settling their conflicts. 
4.  Recommended Measures for Local Courts 
Local court personnel have to be provided with knowledge of ethnic conflicts in 
Indonesia so they will more easily identify which cases could potentially trigger ethnic 
conflict, such as case involving traditional methods of water distribution and land 
allotment, alcohol abuse, individual or inter-group clashes based on ethnicity, and 
violation of public orders during political campaigns based on ethnicity and religious 
affiliation. 
Local courts backed by security forces have to conduct fair and impartial trials 
immediately in all potential ethnic conflict cases before any conflict spreads and escalates 
into a large-scale ethnic conflict.   
5. Recommended Measures for Local Religious and Informal Leaders 
Local government and security elements and local religious and community 
leaders need to establish a forum for regular inter-faith and cross-cultural dialogue. They 
need to inform local people about the consequences and impact of settling local conflicts 
by resorting to coercion, as was the case of Maluku, Poso, and Kalimantan. 
Local religious and community leaders have to realize that their roles in 
preventing ethnic conflict are essential within their communities and that no religious or 
individual statement from the leaders should provoke local people to resort to violence in 
order to settle a conflict. They need to encourage people, particularly in areas where 
severe ethnic conflict has broken out, to be more tolerant and respectful of each other. 
Given their roles as local leaders, religious and community leaders need to be able 
to settle various local conflicts through local traditional laws. This measure needs the 
participation of local governments to support and encourage local leaders to do so in 
order to prevent future ethnic conflicts. Traditional laws, when dealing with local 
conflicts, have proven effective in settling local conflicts before 1998, such as Sintuvu 
Maroso in Poso and Pela Gandong in Maluku. 
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All of these recommendations were drawn from lessons learned in the case studies 
I did of ethnic conflict in Maluku and Poso from 1998 onward. Their purpose is to 
eliminate possible political disputes, economic and social disparities, religious and 
cultural differences, and tribal clashes before they arise.  By giving local governments 
and religious and community leaders more powerful and by making local police, armed 
forces, and the courts more knowledgeable and responsive to local issues, future conflicts 
can be reduced if not eliminated completely. In short, conflict resolution rather than 
escalating the problem should become the main focus in resolving all conflicts. It is my 
hope that these recommendations will reach the hands of those directly responsible for 
making national policy. 
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